

Race, redistribution, and partisanship: evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic

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Abstract

In the United States, support for means-tested transfer programs (welfare) is strongly associated with views about African Americans, and decreases with white respondents' negative evaluations of Black recipients. In the aftermath of the unprecedented crises precipitated by the spread of COVID-19, however, individuals may be more willing to support public policies that assist those affected since the health and employment risks are shared across the population. We investigate this hypothesis over the course of three survey experiments. First, we find that respondents are less likely to support redistributive policies when primed to think of the burden of COVID-19 falling disproportionately on Black and Hispanic communities, with the result driven by the response of Republican identifiers. Second, we find that information about the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic has no effect on policy attitudes. Third, once partisanship becomes salient after the 2020 election, racial framing no longer moves the policy views of Republican identifiers in a priming experiment conducted in March 2021, even though it continues to reduce support for explicitly redistributive taxes outside that group.

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1 Introduction

Support for redistributive public policies is shaped, in part, by their perceived beneficiaries. Diverse societies (along salient political cleavages) tend to feature low levels of support for redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist, 2012; Alesina and Stantcheva, 2020). In the United States, support for means-tested transfer programs (welfare) among white respondents is strongly associated with views about African Americans, and decreases with their negative evaluations of Black recipients (Gilens, 1996).

In the aftermath of unprecedented health and economic crises precipitated by the spread of COVID-19, however, individuals may be more willing to support public policies that assist those affected. A priori, we may expect that the scale of the public health challenge (about 800,000 cases and more than 3,000 deaths per day at its peak) and economic devastation (employment rates falling by 37% at the peak of the recession (Chetty et al., 2020)) would buoy support for public policies that insure against adverse health and economic events.¹

To test this hypothesis, we conducted three survey experiments on a panel of respondents between October 2020 and March 2021. We find that respondents are less likely to support redistributive policies when primed to consider that the burden of COVID-19 has fallen disproportionately on Black and Hispanic communities—a response driven primarily by those who identify as Republican. We also find that, in the weeks immediately after the 2020 election, information about the severity of the pandemic had no measurable effect on respondents’ policy preferences. By March 2021, partisanship had come to structure these preferences: even a stronger treatment emphasizing racial disparities no longer influenced the views of Republican identifiers, although it continued to depress support for explicitly redistributive taxes outside that group. Taken together, these findings suggest that racial considerations can shape attitudes when partisan positions are still fluid. But once party lines are drawn, co-partisans align with their party’s stance,

¹Data on cases and deaths obtained from the New York Times COVID-19 database, accessed April 1, 2024.

leaving little room for persuasion—even from more forceful information cues. These patterns are robust to the choice of covariate adjustment, as we show in Appendix [A.5](#).

To rationalize this pattern, we develop a simple Bayesian model of how racial framing moves redistributive preferences. In the model, the same redistributive policy can be processed under either a *race-neutral* framing—as universal economic policy, pandemic relief, generic social insurance—or a *race-targeted* framing, in which the same instrument is read primarily as a transfer to non-co-ethnic beneficiaries financed by taxes on the incumbent racial majority. Voters do not directly observe which framing applies to a given proposal and hold a prior over it; a racial frame—in our setting, reminding respondents of the disproportionate burden of COVID-19 on Black and Hispanic communities—operates as a noisy Bayesian signal in favor of the race-targeted reading. Voters perform a standard update, with the cue’s informational leverage scaling with the diffuseness of their prior over framing.

This shift in framing weight reduces support for the policy through two distinct channels. The first, a *partisan cue-taking* channel, operates through voters’ perception of where their party stands: under the race-targeted reading, the Republican party’s historical resistance to race-linked transfers becomes the relevant party position, opening a wide gap with the policy and depressing co-partisan support through the partisan component of utility. The second, a *beneficiary-composition* channel, operates through voters’ own ideal points: white voters with even mild racial conservatism prefer less generous redistribution under the race-targeted reading, opening a gap between their personal ideal point and the policy that is largest precisely on the most explicitly redistributive instruments—wealth taxes, income taxes, direct cash transfers—and smallest on universal items such as universal health insurance or a federal job guarantee. Either channel can be inert for a given group in a given period; the cue produces a behavioral effect when at least one channel carries a meaningful gap and prior framing uncertainty leaves room for the cue to update beliefs.

This logic maps directly onto the two periods of our experiment. In October 2020 the partisan

cue-taking channel dominates: COVID-19 relief is a genuinely new issue, the outgoing Republican administration is itself sponsoring generous transfers against the party's historical grain, and positional uncertainty is high among Republican identifiers. The racial cue moves their perceived party position from the incumbent's relatively generous offering toward the party's well-known oppositional stance on race-linked redistribution, and the data show a sharp drop in Republican support for the most explicitly redistributive outcomes under the Black-and-Hispanic framing. By March 2021, with a Democratic administration in office and Republican opposition to its COVID-19 fiscal program established as partisan common knowledge, the partisan cue-taking channel has collapsed among Republicans: the same racial frame—indeed, a stronger one—has no further room to move their support. The beneficiary-composition channel, however, has been activated for white non-Republicans by the shift in the policy environment toward explicitly redistributive instruments (the American Rescue Plan, expanded child tax credits, and proposed wealth and income taxes). It is they who drive the Wave 3 decline in support for the wealth and income taxes, and the absence of an analogous decline on universal health insurance and the federal job guarantee is consistent with the model's prediction that this channel operates only on items where the personal dimension-difference between race-neutral and race-targeted readings is meaningful. What changes between the two waves, in this reading, is not the meaning of the racial framing or voters' underlying racial attitudes, but which of the two channels is active and for whom.

Theory: a model of partisan cue-taking under uncertainty

Consider a uni-dimensional policy space $[0, 1] \subset \mathbb{R}$, representing redistributive policy, where lower values denote more generous redistribution. Voters have exogenous partisan identities (subscript P) and policy ideal points $x_j \in [0, 1]$ drawn independently of partisan identity. The

utility of voter j with ideal point x_j from policy r is:

$$U_j(r) = \begin{cases} -(1 - \alpha)(x_j - r)^2 - \alpha(x_{P_j} - r)^2, & \text{if } x_{P_j} \neq \emptyset \\ -(x_j - r)^2, & \text{if } x_{P_j} = \emptyset \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where x_{P_j} is the position of j 's party and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ captures the strength of partisanship. When α is close to 1, voters prefer policies aligned with their party even when these diverge from their own ideal point.

A central feature of redistributive policy in this setting is that any given proposal admits two stylized framings. Under a *race-neutral* reading (N), a transfer-and-tax program is processed as universal economic policy – pandemic relief, social insurance, the financing of generic public goods. Under a *race-targeted* reading (T), the same instrument is processed primarily as a transfer to non-co-ethnic beneficiaries, financed by taxes on the incumbent racial majority. Voters' personal ideal points and their parties' positions are each potentially indexed by the framing they apply: voter j has ideal points x_j^N and x_j^T , and party P has positions \bar{x}_P^N and \bar{x}_P^T . The single-dimensional formulation in (1) corresponds to the case in which both indices coincide.

We maintain three substantive assumptions about the empirical setting:

- (A1) For white voters, $x_j^T \geq x_j^N$: race-targeted redistribution is weakly less personally attractive than race-neutral redistribution, the standard finding in the U.S. welfare-attitudes literature.
- (A2) For the Republican party, $\bar{x}_R^T > \bar{x}_R^N \geq p$: the party historically opposes redistribution and opposes its race-targeted reading more sharply.
- (A3) For the Democratic party, $\bar{x}_D^T \leq \bar{x}_D^N \leq p$: the party is left of p on both readings, with the race-targeted reading at least as far left, reflecting the party's identification with civil-rights and racial-equity advocacy.

Conditional on framing weight $\theta \in [0, 1]$, voter j 's utility from policy p is the corresponding

mixture:

$$U_j(p, \theta) = (1 - \theta) U_j^N(p) + \theta U_j^T(p), \quad U_j^k(p) = -(1 - \alpha)(x_j^k - p)^2 - \alpha(\bar{x}_{p_j}^k - p)^2, \quad k \in \{N, T\}. \quad (2)$$

Voters do not directly observe θ . They hold a prior $\theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\pi_t, \sigma_t^{\theta 2})$ in period t , where π_t is the prior probability mass placed on the race-targeted reading and $\sigma_t^{\theta 2}$ captures uncertainty about the framing. A *racial cue* ($\rho = 1$) – for instance, a frame that associates the redistributive policy with minority beneficiaries – operates as a noisy signal in favor of the race-targeted reading. Standard Bayesian updating yields a posterior mean:

$$\hat{\theta}_t(\rho) = \begin{cases} \pi_t + \lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t) & \text{if } \rho = 1 \\ \pi_t & \text{if } \rho = 0 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

where, under the standard normal-conjugate Bayesian benchmark with cue noise variance σ_s^2 ,

$$\lambda_t^\theta = \frac{\sigma_t^{\theta 2}}{\sigma_t^{\theta 2} + \sigma_s^2} \in [0, 1] \quad (4)$$

is the Kalman gain on the framing signal. As before, λ_t^θ is increasing in prior framing uncertainty $\sigma_t^{\theta 2}$: voters learn more from the racial cue precisely when their priors over framing are more diffuse. Voters then evaluate policy p using their posterior mean as the framing weight:

$$EU_j(p, \rho) = (1 - \hat{\theta}_t(\rho)) U_j^N(p) + \hat{\theta}_t(\rho) U_j^T(p). \quad (5)$$

The effect of the racial cue on voter j 's expected utility from supporting policy p in period t

is:

$$\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} \equiv EU_j(p, 1) - EU_j(p, 0) = \lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t) [U_j^T(p) - U_j^N(p)]. \quad (6)$$

Proof. By (5), $\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} = (\hat{\theta}_t(1) - \hat{\theta}_t(0))(U_j^T - U_j^N) = \lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t)(U_j^T - U_j^N)$. \square

The sign of the cue's effect is determined by the sign of $U_j^T - U_j^N$, and its magnitude is increasing in (a) prior framing uncertainty $\sigma_t^{\theta^2}$ via λ_t^θ , (b) the prior probability mass available to be shifted, $1 - \pi_t$, and (c) the dimension-difference $|U_j^T - U_j^N|$ in voter j 's personal and partisan utility across the two readings. The dimension-difference itself decomposes into two channels:

$$U_j^T - U_j^N = \underbrace{-(1 - \alpha)[(x_j^T - p)^2 - (x_j^N - p)^2]}_{\text{beneficiary-composition channel}} + \underbrace{-\alpha[(\bar{x}_{P_j}^T - p)^2 - (\bar{x}_{P_j}^N - p)^2]}_{\text{partisan cue-taking channel}}. \quad (7)$$

The first term captures voters' direct utility loss from a policy whose perceived beneficiaries shift toward non-co-ethnic groups; the second captures the partisan-alignment loss from updating perceived party position toward its race-targeted reading. Either channel can be inert for a particular voter or in a particular period; the cue produces a behavioral effect when at least one channel carries a non-trivial dimension-difference and prior framing uncertainty leaves room for the cue to update beliefs.

We consider two periods corresponding to the transition from a Republican to a Democratic administration during the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2020. In both periods, the same redistributive policy p (low, i.e. generous) is under consideration.

Period 1 (Republican incumbent). COVID-19 relief in October 2020 is a genuinely new issue. The prior probability mass on the race-targeted reading is low (π_1 small, since both parties are sponsoring universal pandemic relief) and prior framing uncertainty is high ($\sigma_1^{\theta^2}$ large), so $\lambda_1^\theta (1 -$

π_1) is substantial. For Republicans, $U_j^T - U_j^N$ is large and negative through the partisan cue-taking channel: under (A2), the Republican party's historical resistance to race-linked transfers ($\bar{x}_R^T \gg \bar{x}_R^N \approx p$) opens a wide partisan-position gap between the two readings, and right-leaning personal ideal points reinforce the gap on the beneficiary-composition channel. The cue therefore generates a sharp drop in Republican support for p . For white Democrats, the partisan cue-taking channel is muted under (A3) – the Democratic party's positions are left of p under both readings, and the gap between them is small at this point in the issue's evolution – and the beneficiary-composition channel is not yet activated by an explicitly redistributive policy environment. The Wave-1 effect is correspondingly concentrated among Republicans.

Period 2 (Democratic incumbent). By March 2021, the partisan landscape has crystallized. For Republicans, the race-targeted reading of the Biden-era program is established common knowledge ($\pi_3 \rightarrow 1$) and party-position uncertainty has resolved ($\sigma_3^{\theta 2, R} \rightarrow 0$); either channel implies $\lambda_3^\theta(1 - \pi_3) \rightarrow 0$ for them, and the cue is informationally inert. For white Democrats, the policy environment now consists of explicitly redistributive instruments – the American Rescue Plan, expanded child tax credits, and proposed wealth and income taxes – for which the beneficiary-composition channel is far more active than in Wave 1: $|x_j^T - x_j^N|$ has grown precisely because the policies under consideration are now the ones whose perceived fiscal incidence is most directly shaped by beneficiary composition. Within-coalition messaging on race-targeting in the Democratic Party remains mixed, so $\sigma_3^{\theta 2, wD}$ is still moderate and $\lambda_3^\theta(1 - \pi_3)$ is non-negligible. The cue therefore produces a moderate negative effect on white Democrats' support, concentrated on the items where the beneficiary-composition channel is largest – wealth tax, income tax, and direct cash transfers – rather than on universal health insurance or a federal job guarantee, whose universality leaves $|x_j^T - x_j^N|$ small.

A further comparative static follows directly from (4):

$$\frac{\partial |\Delta_{\rho} U_j^{(t)}|}{\partial \sigma_t^{\theta^2}} > 0. \quad (8)$$

The more uncertain voters are about how the policy will be framed, the larger the informational role of racial cues.

The unifying mechanism is *signal value under uncertainty*, but it now operates in two periods through two channels. In Period 1, the dominant channel is partisan cue-taking among Republicans, whose party-position uncertainty about a new policy was high. In Period 2, the dominant channel is beneficiary-composition among white Democrats, whose personal dimension-difference has been activated by the more explicitly redistributive content of the Biden-era program. What changes across periods is not the meaning of the racial framing itself, nor voters' underlying racial attitudes, but the *margin* on which the cue carries informational value: from partisan position-taking under positional uncertainty to beneficiary-composition assessment under policy-content explicitness.

The formal apparatus above reduces to three substantive claims. First, racial framing of a redistributive policy shifts support for it only when voters are uncertain how to read the policy — uncertain where their party stands on it, or uncertain whether the policy itself is best understood as race-neutral or race-targeted. Where voters already know how to read the policy, the cue is informationally inert, no matter how vivid the framing. Second, when the cue does shift support, it does so through two channels: by updating voters' perception of where their party stands (the *partisan* channel), and by updating voters' perception of who the policy is for (the *beneficiary-composition* channel). The partisan channel is largest when the gap between race-neutral and race-targeted party positions is widest, which historically applies most to the Republican party. The beneficiary-composition channel is largest on the most explicitly redistributive instruments — taxes on the wealthy, direct cash transfers — and small or zero on universal items like a federal

job guarantee or universal health insurance, where the set of beneficiaries is harder to renegotiate. Third, the same racial frame can therefore produce different empirical patterns across periods even when voters' underlying racial attitudes are identical: what changes is not those attitudes but which channel is open, and for whom. In our two waves, the partisan channel is open for Republicans in October 2020 (a new policy, wide intra-party position gap) but not in March 2021; the beneficiary-composition channel is muted in October 2020 (the policy menu still feels universal) but is activated for white non-Republicans by March 2021 (the menu is now explicitly redistributive). The cross-wave sign reversal in who responds to the cue — Republicans in Wave 1, non-Republicans in Wave 3 — and the within-Wave-3 selectivity across items — taxes and transfers yes, universal programs no — both follow from this structure.

Related literature

Regarding preferences, political economists have theorized three sets of determinants: material incentives, in-group out-group differences, and major crises, such as international wars, economic depressions or pandemics. Material incentives posit a link between income and wealth and support for redistribution ([Meltzer and Richard, 1981](#)). The central contention in this family of arguments is that, to the extent that income drives preferences, economic inequality fuels polarization across income ranks regarding redistribution. This would be the case at any given point in time and when factoring future income expectations ([Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019](#)).

Much like economic inequality, in-group out-group differences, whether by race, religion or nation, work to undermine the feasibility of pro-redistributive coalitions. The literature has identified several channels through which the coexistence of multiple races, ethnicities, national identities, religions or other politically salient groups undermines redistribution. Heterogeneity renders the necessary coordination for the provision of public goods less likely ([Poterba, 1997](#)). In-group members refuse to potentially share their assets with out-group members through pooled solutions. As a result, collective initiatives are both less likely and less sustainable ([Habyarimana](#)

et al., 2009). Heterogeneity undermines the emergence of “communities of fate” (Ahlquist and Levi, 2013), conditions perceptions of deservingness (and by implication, fairness and support for redistribution) across groups (Cavaillé, 2023) and tends to exacerbate inter-group conflicts over scarce resources (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina, Giuliano, et al., 2011) and fuel partisan backlash (Cavaillé and Ferwerda, 2023). Conversely, collective action efforts towards public goods provision and the expansion of comprehensive forms of public insurance tend to be significantly more ambitious in ethnically homogeneous polities.

The final set of factors shaping preferences, namely the role of major crises, works in the opposite direction. A widely shared understanding among political economists is that major crises that generate a need for risk sharing facilitate an increase in support for redistribution, either across people or territories. Recent work suggests, for instance, that high income citizens favor redistributive interventions if they are more likely to experience negative externalities from inequality, such as crime (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019). There is also evidence that in the context of economic crises, rich regions are willing to transfer resources to poor regions in federations if they are more likely to experience negative externalities in the form of migration (Beramendi, 2012). Historically, welfare state expansions tend to reflect overlapping distributions of income and risk: coverage grows when those with the capacity to contribute perceive themselves to be vulnerable to negative outcomes (Rehm, 2016). Major crises tend to increase the overlap between the distributions of income and risk, potentially offsetting the polarizing effect of economic inequality and/or inter-group heterogeneity. Under these conditions, short term income losses would be dominated by the benefits of greater insurance. Its importance notwithstanding, risk sharing is far from the only relevant dimension in the political economy of crises.²

Taken together, these three factors shape the distribution of voters’ ideal points on redistribution. While each individual factor is reasonably well understood, there are very few analytical

²For instance, depending on the nature of the incumbent’s response, major shocks can also lead to growing distrust of institutions and political disengagement, paving the way for populist reactions (Margalit, 2019).

opportunities to examine systematically how they combine in shaping voter’s preferences as well as the evolution of such preferences in a politically polarized environment. It is indeed rare to find settings in which the forces driving preferences – risk sharing against a common shock and opposition to policies perceived to benefit disfavored groups – are clearly at odds. The United States is, among advanced democracies, the one in which racial diversity has had the strongest grip on the development of social policy institutions (Lieberman, 1998). Hence, analyzing the political consequences of COVID-19 in the United States provides an ideal case study for assessing the relative importance of these competing forces (risk sharing versus diversity) in shaping political responses to crises.

In the United States, opposition to welfare policies can be rationalized by positing that respondents over-estimate the proportion of welfare recipients who are from a particular group (African Americans, for example), who they consider undeserving (for example, because they hold unfavorable views about group members’ work ethic (Gilens, 1996; Alesina and Stantcheva, 2020)). Still some work finds that opposition to welfare stems from a fear that recipients may become dependent (Cooley, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Boudreau, 2019). Taken together, these factors explain unfavorable attitudes towards race-neutral programs stemming from respondents’ views about the racial composition of beneficiaries, their laziness, and the risk of encouraging welfare dependency. While these considerations may apply to standard policy questions, extant research on risk-pooling events suggests these predispositions should be muted in the aftermath of a large negative shock like the COVID-19 pandemic, when work ethic and dependency are much less relevant. In the rest of the paper, we describe an experimental design to examine two questions posited by the joint consideration of (1) determinants of preference formation and (2) changes in context driven by the resolution of framing uncertainty on emerging policies, that is changes in $\sigma_t^{\theta 2}$ (equivalently, in the Kalman gain λ_t^θ of Eq. (4)):

1. How do inter-group heterogeneity and a major event homogenizing risks across the whole population combine in shaping preferences for redistribution in multi-racial societies? Here

we distinguish two possibilities:

- (a) Dominance of inter-group resentment (H1)
- (b) Dominance of risk-pooling effect associated with the pandemic (H2)

2. How does the process of preference formation interact with partisanship in a highly polarized environment? Our framework identifies two channels through which a racial cue can move support for redistribution:

- (a) *Partisan cue-taking channel.* Early in the process, when party positions on the emerging policy are still uncertain, racial cues carry informational value about the party's stance and co-partisans update their support for redistribution accordingly (H3). Once the party's position on the policy becomes common knowledge, the channel is informationally inert for co-partisans and party positions alone determine their preferences (H4).
- (b) *Beneficiary-composition channel.* Once the policy environment shifts toward explicitly redistributive instruments—direct cash transfers, wealth and income taxation—the racial cue continues to depress support among voters whose framing uncertainty has not collapsed, even outside the party for whom the partisan channel has gone inert. We expect this channel to be concentrated on items where the personal difference between race-neutral and race-targeted readings is largest, rather than on universal items like a federal job guarantee or universal health insurance (H5).

2 Empirical design

We test whether support for a number of public policies is affected by messages that are randomly assigned to respondents. In wave 1, one of the treatment arms informs respondents of the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on Black and Hispanic communities, and another informs them

on the disproportionate effect on poor communities. Randomized allocation to treatment groups allows us to credibly assign differences in responses to the messages viewed by participants. The order in which respondents viewed the policy proposals also was randomized to ensure that the results obtained in this study were not order-dependent. In wave 2, the treatment involves informing respondents about the actual number of cases and deaths in their state of residence. In wave 3, one of the treatment arms provides state level data showing a disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on African Americans relative to whites, while another provides data showing the opposite.

Treatment and control groups are relatively well balanced across most covariates of interest, but we also report the results from specifications, in which we include additional controls. Instead of T-tests of mean differences across groups, we instead examine the standardized maximum mean difference. Characteristics with a difference greater than 0.1 of a standard deviation are considered imbalanced (Stuart, Lee, and Leacy, 2013, S85). Appendix Figures A2, A4, and A6 plot the standardized maximum mean difference across groups for variables of interest for waves 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The estimation framework is as follows:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + W_i' \Theta + \epsilon_i, \tag{9}$$

where T_i is an indicator variables for whether respondents were assigned to the treatment group and W_i is a vector of control variables. In our preferred specifications, these include only variables found to be imbalanced across treatment groups. Additional control variables are included in alternative specifications.

3 Data

Data was collected through an original survey of 2,700 respondents in six states between October 19 and October 23, 2020. Respondents were part of a survey panel maintained by the public opin-

ion survey firm YouGov. An initial sample of 3,077 respondents were interviewed. Respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education to generate samples that were representative at the level of each state (Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia). Each state yielded 450 respondents. The survey included questions about political background and economic conditions, as well as specific questions related to exposure to COVID-19, changes in employment status, application for and receipt of government assistance, as well as views on public policies. The complete list of survey questions is included in Appendix Table C1. Basic demographic information, including age, gender, race, education, family income, political ideology, and party identification was available for all respondents at the outset.

Before the policy questions (see Table 1), respondents also viewed one of three messages that differed in a single sentence. The sample was assigned randomly to the three messages. The control group saw the following message:

Since March 2020, more than 7 million Americans have contracted COVID-19, of whom more than 200,000 have died. The government agency responsible for public health - the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) - reports that ***the impact of COVID-19 differs across communities, cities and states*** (emphasis added).

Remaining respondents composed two treatment groups. In the first, which we will refer to as the *Black and Hispanic* treatment, respondents were presented with the following message:

Since March 2020, more than 7 million Americans have contracted COVID-19, of whom more than 200,000 have died. The government agency responsible for public health - the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) - reports that ***COVID-19 disproportionately affects black and hispanic communities, where cases and deaths are higher than in the rest of the population*** (emphasis added).

Table 1: List of policy questions

Policy	Question text
Univ health insurance	I support extending health insurance to all Americans, regardless of employment status for a small monthly premium payable by those covered by the program.
Free univ health ins	I support extending health insurance to all Americans, regardless of employment status, and at no cost to those being covered. The costs would be met through tax revenues.
Federal job guarantee	I support offering employment to all job seekers who are unable to find a job through a federal job guarantee program.
Longer unemp benefits	I support extending unemployment benefits for as long as it takes for the economy to return to its employment level before the COVID-19 pandemic.
+\$600 unemp benefits	I support expanding weekly unemployment benefits by up to \$600 (\$2,400 a month) through the end of 2020.
Wealth tax	I support the introduction of a wealth tax on households with more than \$25 million in wealth holdings in order to raise revenues to reduce the deficit and fund programs that were introduced in response to COVID-19.
Higher income tax	I support an increase in income taxes for households earning above \$200,000

In the second, which we will refer to as the *poverty* treatment, respondents were presented with the following message:

Since March 2020, more than 7 million Americans have contracted COVID-19, of whom more than 200,000 have died. The government agency responsible for public health - the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) - reports that ***COVID-19 disproportionately affects poor communities, where cases and deaths are higher than in the rest of the population*** (emphasis added).

The survey questions following these messages elicited respondents' agreement or disagreement with the policy proposals listed in Table 1, among others. The full list of survey questions is in Appendix Table C1.

Respondents indicated whether they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, somewhat disagreed, or strongly disagreed with each of these statements. To analyze the impact of treatment on respondents' views, we group the two options "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree" into a single category, and group the rest into its complement. Henceforth,

when referring to *agreement* with a policy proposal, we mean respondents either choosing that they strongly or somewhat agree. There was significant variation in baseline rates of agreement in the control group. Responses from those in the control group are shown in Figure 4. The position that economic activity should never be restricted achieved the lowest agreement rate (31.4%), followed closely by a proposal to expand federal programs designed to help large corporations (31.5%). Federal programs to help small businesses garnered the highest rate of agreement (87.4%), followed by a proposal for a federal job guarantee program (75.7%).

A second wave was deployed in December 2020, in which respondents were randomly assigned into an informational treatment group or the control group. Those in the informational treatment group received accurate information about the number of cases and deaths in their state, while those in the control group did not.

A final wave was deployed in March 2021. In this survey experiment, respondents received one of two treatment messages. In the first, they saw state-level information on cases and deaths, in which African Americans experienced a disproportionate burden, relative to whites. In the second, they saw information that conveyed the opposite message. Finally, in the control group, respondents saw a neutral message that showed the overall number of cases and deaths without breaking down the totals by race.

4 Results

A summary of the main effects is in Table 2. The table reports coefficients from a single canonical specification estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted) and the pre-specified adjustment set for each wave. The Wave 1 panels show that priming respondents to think of COVID-19's disproportionate burden on Black and Hispanic communities (the Minorities arm) reduces support for the two most directly redistributive policies—the wealth tax and higher income taxes—and for the \$600 weekly unemployment top-up. The *Treatment* \times *Repub-*

lican rows report the additional effect among Republican identifiers, and point estimates and significance should be read directly from the table.

In Wave 3 the Affects Blacks arm likewise reduces support for the wealth tax and the income-tax proposal, but the interaction with Republican is positive for the wealth tax, indicating that the Wave 3 decline is concentrated among non-Republicans. We read this pattern as consistent with partisanship having largely superseded racial cues among Republican identifiers by March 2021, while non-Republicans remain responsive to explicit racialized framing.

In Wave 1 (October 2020), respondents randomly assigned to the cue emphasizing that the burden of COVID-19 fell disproportionately on Black and Hispanic communities expressed lower support for redistributive policies than the control group. The treatment coefficient was negative for every one of the six policies, and is statistically significant for the \$600 weekly unemployment top-up (-0.037 , $p < 0.10$), the wealth tax (-0.047 , $p < 0.05$), and higher income taxes (-0.038 , $p < 0.10$); see Figure 7. Figure 9 shows the interaction with a Republican indicator: among Republican identifiers, the additional decline on the wealth tax and higher income taxes is of comparable magnitude—roughly -0.083 in each case, significant at 10%. In contrast, the poverty-focused cue yields smaller and less consistent changes. Only the coefficient on universal health insurance is marginally significant in the aggregate (-0.041 , $p < 0.10$). When interacting with Republican identification, only support for free universal health insurance shows a statistically significant decline of about 12 percentage points (-0.118 , $p < 0.01$; see Figure 10). At the same time, neither wealth nor income taxes exhibit a decline among Republican respondents exposed to the poverty cue. These findings indicate that, prior to the 2020 election, racialized (but not poverty) frames could still move policy preferences, and that the effect was concentrated among Republican identifiers for the two most explicitly redistributive policies.

In December 2020, providing accurate state-level information on cases and deaths did not measurably alter attitudes toward policies in response to the spread of COVID-19 (Table A8 and Figure A5). We interpret this null result as pointing to the limited persuasive potency of infor-

mational updates once the pandemic—and its partisan interpretation—was highly salient.

By March 2021, after the election and inauguration of Joe Biden, partisanship had become the dominant organizing principle of respondents' policy views. By this point, the Democratic party is in the policy-making role, a significant change from the state of affairs five months prior when the White House was under the control of the party that is traditionally opposed to redistribution. At that point, the incumbent administration needed to respond to a hitherto unprecedented situation that forced it to take far more lenient positions on redistribution than it would have otherwise. The policies resulting from that crisis response were supported by the Democrats, making their partisan nature unclear and hence less salient. However, after capturing the White House, Democrats became tied to redistributive policies, including the second phase of stimulus payments that were passed over the objection of Republicans. Redistributive policies at this time once again acquired a partisan hue. This can be seen in Figures 16 and 17, which show the baseline support for proposed policies among respondents in the control group in waves 1 and 3. Whereas there was no systematic difference between levels of support among Democrats, support among Republican identifiers declined across all policies.

In Wave 3, the Affects-Blacks cue reduced support for the wealth tax (-0.050 , $p < 0.10$) and for higher income taxes (-0.058 , $p < 0.05$) relative to the control group (Table 2; Figure 12), while the Affects-whites cue produced no statistically significant changes (Figure 13). The interaction rows, however, make clear that the Wave 3 decline on the wealth tax does not come from Republicans: the Affects Blacks \times Republican coefficient for the wealth tax is *positive* ($+0.104$, $p < 0.10$), roughly offsetting the main effect for the Republican subgroup. We read this together as evidence that, once party positions had crystallized, the partisan cue-taking channel of Section 2 had gone inert *among Republican identifiers*; outside that group, the racial frame continued to depress support, but only on the most explicitly redistributive items (the wealth and income taxes), as the model's beneficiary-composition channel predicts—and *not* on universal items such as health insurance or the federal job guarantee.

The patterns reported in this section are robust to the choice of covariate adjustment. Appendix Figures [A8](#), [A9](#), [A11](#), and [A12](#) plot each treatment coefficient across six (Wave 1) or seven (Wave 3) progressively richer specifications, ranging from no controls through the canonical adjustment set used in the main text (labelled “paper main”) to a specification that further adds partisanship, ideology, and—for Wave 3 only—the respondent’s own Wave-1 response to the same policy item as a baseline control. The Wave 1 negative main effects on the wealth tax, income tax, and the \$600 unemployment top-up under the Black-and-Hispanic cue, the Wave 3 negative main effects on the wealth and income taxes under the Affects-Blacks cue, the negative Wave 1 Minorities \times Rep interactions on the two tax outcomes, and the positive Wave 3 Affects-Blacks \times Rep interaction on the wealth tax are all essentially invariant to which adjustment set is used (Appendix Figures [A10](#) and [A13](#)). Including the respondent’s Wave-1 response on the same item as a control in the Wave-3 wealth-tax model tightens the confidence interval without shifting the point estimate, raising the significance of the Affects-Blacks main effect from $p = 0.068$ to $p = 0.038$. The raw treatment–control differences in mean agreement, computed without any covariate adjustment and broken out by race and by party identification, reproduce these patterns directly from the data (Appendix Figure [A7](#)).

5 Conclusion

This paper investigates the role of partisan salience in mediating the well-documented relationship between preferences for redistribution and beliefs about its likely beneficiaries. A long standing literature mainly focused on the United States has established that white respondents express lower support for redistributive policies when they expect that African Americans will benefit from the transfers made. With this in mind, emphasizing that minority communities were disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 pandemic would make policies aimed at addressing the harm more likely to be perceived as benefiting those communities. We would expect, therefore,

that support for such policies declines among respondents in the relevant treatment group. What we find instead is that the effect of racialized frames has a partisan dimension. In the waning days of a Republican presidency in late 2020, baseline support among Republican identifiers for a variety of redistributive policies is relatively high, including a surprising majority who support a federal job guarantee. Among this group, the racial frame emphasizing the impact of COVID-19 on minority communities reduces support for the most directly redistributive policies (a wealth tax, and an increase in income taxes) by about 8 percentage points relative to non-Republicans (the treatment \times Republican coefficient), on top of a negative main effect of about 5 percentage points.

Following the presidential election of 2020, and the change from a Republican administration to a Democratic one, baseline support for all the policies we investigate declines among Republican identifiers, but there is no analogous increase in support among Democratic identifiers in the sample. We then expose the entire sample to an informational experiment with stronger racial priming. Namely, members of one treatment arm receive information showing a disproportionate incidence of COVID-19 cases and deaths among Black residents of four states, while members of another receive information showing a disproportionate incidence among white residents of a different set of four states. States were carefully selected such that the reported rates of cases and deaths were accurate at the time of the survey. Unlike the results of the experimental treatment conducted before the 2020 election, the stronger racial frame no longer shifted the views of *Republican identifiers* on any of the redistributive policies—the treatment \times Republican coefficient on the wealth tax is large and positive (+0.104, $p < 0.10$), essentially offsetting the aggregate decline. Outside of Republican identifiers, however, the Affects-Blacks cue continued to depress support for the two most directly redistributive policies (the wealth tax and higher income taxes, each by about 5 percentage points).

How can we explain these seemingly contradictory results? Whereas a relatively gentle racial frame delivered in October 2020 elicited a large and significant reduction in support for redistribu-

tive policies among Republican identifiers, a stronger frame in March 2021 had no detectable effect among that same group—the treatment \times Republican coefficients in Wave 3 are small, statistically indistinguishable from zero for every outcome, and *positive* for the wealth tax. We argue that by March 2021, support for redistributive programs as part of the COVID-19 response had already declined among Republican identifiers because the party in power had changed. For example, in response to the question about the wealth tax, approval among Republican identifiers in the control group declined between wave 1 (October 2020) and wave 3 (March 2021) by more than 10 percentage points—of similar magnitude to the treatment-induced decline elicited by the Black-and-Hispanic cue in Wave 1. Once party positions had crystallized, Republican identifiers no longer needed an external racial cue to arrive at the position associated with their party.

Viewed together, the pattern across the two waves is one in which race-based framing continues to shift redistributive preferences throughout the study period but, importantly, never for the same group twice. In October 2020 the Black-and-Hispanic cue moved Republican identifiers (the treatment \times Rep interaction on the wealth and income taxes is negative and marginally significant in Wave 1), while it did not detectably move non-Republicans or interact with Democratic identification. Five months later, the sign of the interaction has reversed: the Wave 3 Affects-Blacks \times Rep interaction on the wealth tax is positive and marginally significant, essentially offsetting the aggregate decline within the Republican subsample, while the main effect on the wealth and income taxes—which is now driven by non-Republicans—remains negative and statistically significant. Our model rationalizes this asymmetry through a two-channel structure. In Wave 1 the cue operates primarily through a *partisan cue-taking* channel that is largest for Republicans, because both their position-uncertainty about a new policy and the gap between race-neutral and race-targeted Republican party positions are wide. In Wave 3 that channel has collapsed for Republicans—positions on the Biden program are common knowledge—and the cue operates instead through a *beneficiary-composition* channel that activates on the most explicitly redistributive items: the wealth tax, income taxes, and direct cash transfers, but *not* universal

health insurance or the federal job guarantee, where the items' universality muffles any framing-induced personal-utility difference. Race, in this reading, works throughout the period we study; what changes is which channel is active, and therefore which group is persuadable. These conclusions are robust to the choice of covariates (including adjustment for partisanship, ideology, and the respondent's own Wave-1 response on the same item), and they are visible in the raw treatment-control contrasts; see Appendix [A.5](#).

6 Tables and figures




Figure 1: Timeline of COVID relief policies

Note: this figure shows the timing of COVID-19 relief bills, electoral dates, and the dates of survey waves. The amounts spent by each relief bill are as follows: Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 (H.R. 6074 - \$8.3 billion), Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA - \$104 billion), Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES - \$2.2 trillion), Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (PPP - \$484 billion), Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (H.R. 133 - \$900 billion), and American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARP - \$1.9 trillion). Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) introduced 14-day paid leave for workers affected by the pandemic.




Figure 2: Assignment of respondents to study arms in wave 1




Figure 3: Assignment of respondents to study arms in wave 3




Figure 4: Baseline agreement with policy proposals among control group respondents




Figure 5: Baseline agreement with policy proposals, by party




Figure 6: Balance plot for white respondents in wave 1

Note: this figure shows the maximum absolute standardized mean differences across treatment groups, restricted to white respondents (full-sample balance appears in Appendix Figure A2). Each dot corresponds to the variable indicated on the y-axis. The dotted line is at 0.1, the suggested threshold (Stuart, Lee, and Leacy, 2013, S85). Employment, family income, and ideology are imbalanced across groups and enter the canonical adjustment set.




Figure 7: Black and Hispanic treatment in wave 1

Note: this figure plots the treatment-effect coefficients and 90% confidence intervals for the Black and Hispanic treatment in Wave 1, estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted). Canonical specification per Equation 9: employment, ideology, family-income, and race controls; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure 8: Poor treatment in wave 1

Note: this figure plots the treatment-effect coefficients and 90% confidence intervals for the Poor treatment in Wave 1, estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted). Canonical specification per Equation 9: employment, ideology, family-income, and race controls; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure 9: Black and Hispanic treatment in wave 1 by party

Note: this figure plots the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals on the interaction between the Black and Hispanic treatment indicator in Wave 1 and an indicator for Republican identification, estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted). Canonical specification per Equation 9: employment, ideology, family-income, and race controls; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure 10: Poor treatment in wave 1 by party

Note: this figure plots the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals on the interaction between the Poor treatment indicator in Wave 1 and an indicator for Republican identification, estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted). Canonical specification per Equation 9: employment, ideology, family-income, and race controls; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure 11: Balance plot for white respondents in wave 3

Note: this figure shows the maximum absolute standardized mean differences across treatment groups, restricted to white respondents (full-sample balance appears in Appendix Figure A6). Each dot corresponds to the variable indicated on the y-axis. The dotted line is at 0.1, the suggested threshold (Stuart, Lee, and Leacy, 2013, S85). Income, education, and employment are imbalanced across groups and enter the canonical adjustment set.




Figure 12: Black treatment in wave 3

Note: this figure plots the treatment-effect coefficients and 90% confidence intervals for the Affects-Blacks treatment in Wave 3, estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted). Canonical specification per Equation 9: employment, education, family-income, and race controls; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure 13: White treatment in wave 3

Note: this figure plots the treatment-effect coefficients and 90% confidence intervals for the Affects-whites treatment in Wave 3, estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted). Canonical specification per Equation 9: employment, education, family-income, and race controls; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure 14: Affects-Blacks treatment in wave 3 by party

Note: this figure plots the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals on the interaction between the Affects-Blacks treatment indicator in Wave 3 and an indicator for Republican identification, estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted). Canonical specification per Equation 9: employment, education, family-income, and race controls; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure 15: Affects-whites treatment in wave 3 by party

Note: this figure plots the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals on the interaction between the Affects-whites treatment indicator in Wave 3 and an indicator for Republican identification, estimated on the full sample with race indicators (White omitted). Canonical specification per Equation 9: employment, education, family-income, and race controls; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure 16: Change in agreement between wave 1 and wave 3 among white republicans

Note: this figure plots the share of respondents in either control groups of wave 1 or wave 3 who agree with policy proposals among respondents who are white Republicans.




Figure 17: Change in agreement between wave 1 and wave 3 among white Democrats

Note: this figure plots the share of respondents in either control groups of wave 1 or wave 3 who agree with policy proposals among respondents who are white Democrats.

	Health policy		Labor market		Redistributive policy	
	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
	<i>Wave 1: main effects</i>					
Minorities	-0.028 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.037* (0.021)	-0.047** (0.020)	-0.038* (0.021)
Poor	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.021)
	<i>Wave 1: treatment × Republican</i>					
Minorities × Republican	0.033 (0.049)	-0.035 (0.045)	-0.026 (0.047)	0.008 (0.049)	-0.083* (0.047)	-0.083* (0.047)
Poor × Republican	0.017 (0.051)	-0.118*** (0.045)	-0.007 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.049)	0.000 (0.048)	-0.029 (0.048)
	<i>Wave 3: main effects</i>					
Affects Blacks	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.027)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.050* (0.027)	-0.058** (0.028)
Affects whites	-0.003 (0.027)	0.032 (0.027)	0.031 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.028)	0.002 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.027)
	<i>Wave 3: treatment × Republican</i>					
Affects Blacks × Republican	-0.066 (0.059)	0.013 (0.052)	-0.022 (0.061)	-0.013 (0.056)	0.104* (0.059)	0.019 (0.058)
Affects whites × Republican	-0.005 (0.060)	0.024 (0.053)	-0.068 (0.060)	-0.041 (0.056)	0.060 (0.058)	-0.001 (0.058)

Table 2: Summary of main results

Notes: Ordinary least squares; dependent variables are agreement (0–1) with each policy. All estimates use the **full sample** and include race indicators (White omitted). Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. *Main effects* rows report coefficients on assignment to the minority- or poverty-focused cue (Wave 1), or to the cues emphasizing Black or white incidence of COVID-19 (Wave 3), relative to control. *Treatment × Republican* rows report the interaction with Republican party identification. Wave 1 controls: employment categories, ideology (linear score and indicator for “not sure”), family income (linear score and indicator for “prefer not to say”), and race (linear indicator set, white omitted). Wave 3 controls: employment categories, education (continuous), family income (linear score and indicator for missing income), and race—the pre-specified adjustment set for covariates that remained imbalanced after randomization. Appendix tables report the same canonical specification restricted to the **white subsample** (Tables A1, A3, A10, A12) as a robustness check. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Republicans Only: Models 1-4

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
post	0.071*** (0.007)	0.071*** (0.007)	0.071*** (0.007)	0.042*** (0.012)
age		-0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.001** (0.0002)	
female		0.044*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	
black		0.176*** (0.032)	0.168*** (0.035)	
hispanic		0.068*** (0.015)	0.051*** (0.015)	
income			-0.008*** (0.001)	
Constant	0.372*** (0.005)	0.362*** (0.014)	0.484*** (0.017)	0.512*** (0.009)
Question fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes
State fixed effects	No	No	No	No
Observations	9,102	8,713	8,307	9,102
R ²	0.011	0.021	0.039	0.218
Adjusted R ²	0.011	0.020	0.039	0.217
Residual Std. Error	0.337 (df = 9100)	0.337 (df = 8707)	0.334 (df = 8300)	0.300 (df = 9094)
F Statistic	100.707*** (df = 1; 9100)	37.167*** (df = 5; 8707)	56.760*** (df = 6; 8300)	362.191*** (df = 7; 9094)

Notes

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Dependent variable: Question-level redistribution support (0-1 scale).

Data: Republican-only subset with question observations.

Post = 1 for post-election items, 0 for pre-election items.

Table 4: Republicans Only: Models 5-8

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Model 5 (1)	Model 6 (2)	Model 7 (3)	Model 8 (4)
post	0.042*** (0.013)	0.041*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.224)	0.083 (0.151)
age	-0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.001** (0.0002)	-0.019*** (0.005)	
female	0.044*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.007)		
black	0.175*** (0.029)	0.167*** (0.031)		
hispanic	0.068*** (0.013)	0.052*** (0.013)		
income		-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.038*** (0.008)	
Constant	0.503*** (0.015)	0.620*** (0.017)	1.802*** (0.283)	0.297** (0.136)
Question fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,713	8,307	24	47
R ²	0.227	0.243	0.717	0.645
Adjusted R ²	0.226	0.242	0.535	0.519
Residual Std. Error	0.299 (df = 8701)	0.296 (df = 8294)	0.274 (df = 14)	0.261 (df = 34)
F Statistic	232.554*** (df = 11; 8701)	221.930*** (df = 12; 8294)	3.936** (df = 9; 14)	5.144*** (df = 12; 34)

Notes *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Dependent variable: Question-level redistribution support (0-1 scale).

Data: Republican-only subset with question observations.

Post = 1 for post-election items, 0 for pre-election items.

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A Supplemental Tables and Figures

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A.1 Wave 1 results

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
Minorities	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.021)	-0.043* (0.023)	-0.034 (0.021)	-0.031 (0.022)
Poor	-0.047* (0.025)	-0.029 (0.022)	-0.044** (0.021)	-0.051** (0.023)	-0.032 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.023)
Employment: Homemaker	0.020 (0.040)	0.059* (0.035)	0.013 (0.035)	0.028 (0.039)	0.039 (0.037)	-0.026 (0.038)
Employment: Other	0.008 (0.070)	0.104* (0.063)	0.083 (0.055)	0.133** (0.064)	0.152** (0.061)	0.124* (0.065)
Employment: Part-time	0.074** (0.035)	-0.029 (0.034)	0.041 (0.031)	0.020 (0.035)	0.051 (0.033)	0.010 (0.034)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.019 (0.040)	0.069** (0.035)	0.017 (0.033)	0.049 (0.039)	0.099*** (0.034)	0.023 (0.037)
Employment: Retired	-0.021 (0.027)	-0.095*** (0.023)	0.044* (0.025)	0.006 (0.026)	0.014 (0.024)	-0.032 (0.024)
Employment: Student	-0.044 (0.058)	-0.018 (0.045)	-0.041 (0.044)	0.004 (0.046)	-0.034 (0.044)	-0.050 (0.049)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.079 (0.070)	0.022 (0.062)	0.036 (0.060)	0.200*** (0.060)	0.122* (0.063)	-0.058 (0.072)
Employment: Unemployed	0.032 (0.041)	0.081** (0.039)	0.066* (0.035)	0.105*** (0.040)	0.032 (0.038)	-0.031 (0.040)
IdeologyCont	-0.121*** (0.008)	-0.215*** (0.006)	-0.142*** (0.007)	-0.177*** (0.007)	-0.201*** (0.006)	-0.193*** (0.007)
IdeologyContNA	-0.346*** (0.048)	-0.585*** (0.042)	-0.487*** (0.041)	-0.628*** (0.046)	-0.698*** (0.044)	-0.656*** (0.045)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.015 (0.009)	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.016** (0.008)	0.017** (0.008)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.106** (0.043)	-0.251*** (0.036)	-0.150*** (0.039)	-0.033 (0.040)	-0.152*** (0.039)	-0.301*** (0.040)

Table A1: Wave 1 treatment effects (white respondents)

Notes: Ordinary least squares. Sample restricted to white respondents (robustness to the full-sample main summary). Dependent variables are agreement (0–1) with each policy in the column heading. The omitted category for treatment is control; the omitted category for employment is full-time. Pre-specified adjustment set (employment, ideology, family-income); race is omitted because the sample is restricted to white respondents. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; intercept omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
Minorities	-0.028 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.037* (0.021)	-0.047** (0.020)	-0.038* (0.021)
Poor	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.021)
Employment: Homemaker	0.005 (0.037)	0.053 (0.033)	0.002 (0.033)	0.025 (0.036)	0.031 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.035)
Employment: Other	-0.033 (0.064)	0.097* (0.057)	0.069 (0.050)	0.106* (0.057)	0.122** (0.056)	0.097* (0.058)
Employment: Part-time	0.069** (0.032)	-0.009 (0.031)	0.035 (0.029)	0.034 (0.031)	0.045 (0.030)	0.026 (0.031)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.026 (0.036)	0.093** (0.033)	0.040 (0.031)	0.075** (0.036)	0.109** (0.032)	0.046 (0.035)
Employment: Retired	-0.025 (0.025)	-0.088** (0.022)	0.036 (0.023)	0.015 (0.024)	0.017 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.023)
Employment: Student	-0.031 (0.048)	0.006 (0.040)	-0.028 (0.039)	0.052 (0.040)	-0.003 (0.037)	-0.079* (0.042)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.068 (0.061)	0.034 (0.057)	0.051 (0.053)	0.214** (0.053)	0.135** (0.055)	-0.044 (0.066)
Employment: Unemployed	0.021 (0.036)	0.077** (0.034)	0.044 (0.031)	0.117** (0.035)	0.014 (0.033)	-0.038 (0.036)
IdeologyCont	-0.117** (0.008)	-0.209** (0.006)	-0.137** (0.006)	-0.171** (0.006)	-0.195** (0.006)	-0.189** (0.006)
IdeologyContNA	-0.356** (0.041)	-0.606** (0.037)	-0.496** (0.036)	-0.622** (0.039)	-0.693** (0.038)	-0.657** (0.039)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.014* (0.008)	-0.036** (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.020*** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.038*** (0.008)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.103*** (0.039)	-0.226*** (0.034)	-0.129*** (0.035)	-0.027 (0.036)	-0.102*** (0.035)	-0.246*** (0.036)
Race: Asian	0.076 (0.070)	-0.071 (0.083)	-0.003 (0.068)	0.064 (0.073)	-0.032 (0.073)	-0.015 (0.074)
Race: Black	0.088*** (0.029)	0.068** (0.030)	0.024 (0.025)	0.106*** (0.029)	0.048* (0.028)	-0.022 (0.031)
Race: Hispanic	-0.058 (0.054)	-0.041 (0.048)	-0.137*** (0.051)	-0.022 (0.053)	-0.076 (0.050)	-0.155*** (0.052)
Race: Middle Eastern	-0.016 (0.242)	0.373** (0.048)	-0.093 (0.297)	0.047 (0.266)	-0.007 (0.297)	0.033 (0.174)
Race: Native American	-0.210** (0.095)	-0.085 (0.077)	-0.189* (0.097)	-0.077 (0.085)	-0.160* (0.082)	-0.078 (0.097)
Race: Other	-0.071 (0.074)	-0.092 (0.067)	-0.155** (0.075)	-0.160** (0.068)	-0.136** (0.069)	-0.186*** (0.067)
Race: Two or more races	0.016 (0.066)	0.001 (0.061)	-0.049 (0.057)	0.062 (0.060)	-0.009 (0.054)	-0.080 (0.061)

Table A2: Wave 1 treatment effects (full sample with race indicators)

Notes: This is the full-coefficient version of the main summary (Table 2, Wave 1 main-effects panel): full sample with race indicators (white omitted). All additional controls from the pre-specified adjustment set (employment, ideology, family-income) are shown. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; intercept omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
Minorities	-0.030 (0.028)	0.008 (0.026)	0.009 (0.022)	-0.047* (0.026)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.008 (0.026)
Poor	-0.047 (0.029)	0.008 (0.026)	-0.043* (0.023)	-0.049* (0.027)	-0.039 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.027)
Republican	-0.100** (0.042)	-0.054 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.039)	-0.070* (0.042)	-0.064 (0.041)	-0.028 (0.041)
Employment: Homemaker	0.019 (0.040)	0.056 (0.036)	0.014 (0.035)	0.027 (0.039)	0.042 (0.037)	-0.024 (0.038)
Employment: Other	0.004 (0.068)	0.100* (0.060)	0.082 (0.055)	0.130** (0.063)	0.147** (0.059)	0.120* (0.064)
Employment: Part-time	0.068* (0.036)	-0.039 (0.033)	0.040 (0.032)	0.016 (0.035)	0.049 (0.033)	0.006 (0.034)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.017 (0.040)	0.064* (0.035)	0.018 (0.033)	0.047 (0.038)	0.102*** (0.034)	0.024 (0.037)
Employment: Retired	-0.024 (0.027)	-0.099*** (0.023)	0.044* (0.025)	0.004 (0.026)	0.013 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)
Employment: Student	-0.045 (0.058)	-0.020 (0.045)	-0.040 (0.044)	0.003 (0.047)	-0.031 (0.044)	-0.048 (0.049)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.075 (0.071)	0.018 (0.064)	0.038 (0.060)	0.198*** (0.060)	0.126** (0.063)	-0.055 (0.072)
Employment: Unemployed	0.032 (0.040)	0.081** (0.038)	0.066* (0.035)	0.105*** (0.040)	0.032 (0.038)	-0.031 (0.040)
IdeologyCont	-0.102*** (0.010)	-0.192*** (0.008)	-0.137*** (0.009)	-0.162*** (0.009)	-0.180*** (0.009)	-0.173*** (0.009)
IdeologyContNA	-0.301*** (0.050)	-0.534*** (0.043)	-0.476*** (0.044)	-0.593*** (0.047)	-0.649*** (0.046)	-0.613*** (0.047)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.015 (0.009)	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.016** (0.008)	0.017** (0.008)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.106** (0.043)	-0.249*** (0.036)	-0.152*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.040)	-0.158*** (0.039)	-0.305*** (0.040)
Minorities × Republican	0.039 (0.052)	-0.035 (0.047)	-0.038 (0.049)	0.013 (0.052)	-0.097** (0.049)	-0.117** (0.049)
Poor × Republican	0.008 (0.054)	-0.103** (0.047)	-0.004 (0.050)	-0.001 (0.052)	0.021 (0.051)	-0.040 (0.050)

Table A3: Wave 1 treatment × Republican (white respondents)

Notes: Same canonical specification as the summary table's treatment × Republican rows, restricted to white respondents as a robustness check. Race is omitted because the sample is all-white. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; intercept omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+ 600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
Minorities	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.038 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.024)
Poor	-0.044* (0.025)	0.026 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.001 (0.024)
Republican	-0.116*** (0.039)	-0.063* (0.037)	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.088** (0.040)	-0.067* (0.039)	-0.066* (0.038)
Employment: Homemaker	0.005 (0.037)	0.052 (0.033)	0.002 (0.033)	0.025 (0.036)	0.033 (0.034)	-0.034 (0.036)
Employment: Other	-0.039 (0.063)	0.092* (0.054)	0.067 (0.050)	0.101* (0.057)	0.116** (0.054)	0.091 (0.058)
Employment: Part-time	0.063** (0.032)	-0.019 (0.031)	0.033 (0.029)	0.029 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)	0.022 (0.031)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.022 (0.036)	0.086*** (0.032)	0.039 (0.031)	0.072** (0.035)	0.109*** (0.032)	0.044 (0.035)
Employment: Retired	-0.026 (0.025)	-0.090*** (0.022)	0.036 (0.023)	0.014 (0.024)	0.017 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.023)
Employment: Student	-0.029 (0.048)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.027 (0.039)	0.053 (0.040)	0.000 (0.037)	-0.076* (0.041)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.066 (0.062)	0.031 (0.058)	0.052 (0.052)	0.212*** (0.052)	0.136** (0.054)	-0.042 (0.066)
Employment: Unemployed	0.022 (0.036)	0.079** (0.034)	0.044 (0.031)	0.118*** (0.035)	0.016 (0.033)	-0.036 (0.036)
IdeologyCont	-0.097*** (0.009)	-0.185*** (0.008)	-0.128*** (0.008)	-0.152*** (0.008)	-0.175*** (0.008)	-0.167*** (0.008)
IdeologyContNA	-0.307*** (0.043)	-0.551*** (0.038)	-0.476*** (0.038)	-0.579*** (0.040)	-0.646*** (0.039)	-0.606*** (0.041)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.014* (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.038*** (0.008)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.105*** (0.039)	-0.225*** (0.035)	-0.130*** (0.035)	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.106*** (0.035)	-0.249*** (0.036)
Race: Asian	0.068 (0.069)	-0.084 (0.082)	-0.005 (0.068)	0.057 (0.071)	-0.037 (0.072)	-0.022 (0.074)
Race: Black	0.069** (0.029)	0.044 (0.030)	0.016 (0.026)	0.089*** (0.029)	0.029 (0.028)	-0.042 (0.031)
Race: Hispanic	-0.068 (0.054)	-0.056 (0.049)	-0.141*** (0.052)	-0.031 (0.053)	-0.085* (0.049)	-0.165*** (0.051)
Race: Middle Eastern	-0.037 (0.241)	0.349*** (0.052)	-0.102 (0.297)	0.028 (0.268)	-0.028 (0.295)	0.011 (0.180)
Race: Native American	-0.214** (0.095)	-0.089 (0.080)	-0.192** (0.097)	-0.081 (0.087)	-0.166** (0.084)	-0.084 (0.097)
Race: Other	-0.098 (0.075)	-0.127* (0.067)	-0.165** (0.076)	-0.184*** (0.069)	-0.158** (0.069)	-0.212*** (0.068)
Race: Two or more races	-0.001 (0.066)	-0.019 (0.061)	-0.056 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.060)	-0.024 (0.054)	-0.097 (0.062)
Minorities × Republican	0.033 (0.049)	-0.035 (0.045)	-0.026 (0.047)	0.008 (0.049)	-0.083* (0.047)	-0.083* (0.047)
Poor × Republican	0.017 (0.051)	-0.118*** (0.045)	-0.007 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.049)	-0.000 (0.048)	-0.029 (0.048)

Table A4: Wave 1 treatment × Republican (full sample with race indicators)

Notes: This is the full-coefficient version of the main summary (Table 2, Wave 1 interaction panel): full sample with race indicators (white omitted). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; intercept omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.




Figure A1: Mean differences in agreement by party and treatment group

Note: Each plot shows mean agreement (with confidence intervals) for Democrats (left panel) and Republicans (right panel) across the three treatment arms; the horizontal dotted line marks the control-group mean within each party panel. C is the control group; T1 is the Black and Hispanic treatment; T2 is the poor communities treatment.

A.2 Survey wave 1




Figure A2: Covariate balance plot across the three treatment arms in Wave 1 survey experiment

Table A5: Covariate balance table across the three treatment arms in Wave 1 survey

	Control (N = 875)	Black and Hispanic treatment (N = 918)	Poverty treatment (N = 907)
Gender			
Female	521 (60)	524 (57)	510 (57)
Male	345 (40)	389 (43)	391 (43)
Non-binary	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Other	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Prefer not to answer	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Unknown/Missing	9 (1.03%)	5 (0.54%)	6 (0.66%)
Race			
White	715 (82)	755 (82)	736 (81)
Asian	19 (2)	10 (1)	10 (1)
Black	80 (9)	88 (10)	95 (10)
Hispanic	27 (3)	26 (3)	22 (2)
Middle Eastern	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)
Native American	8 (1)	9 (1)	12 (1)
Other	10 (1)	12 (1)	17 (2)
Two or more races	15 (2)	17 (2)	14 (2)
EducationCont			
minimum	1.00	1.00	1.00
median (IQR)	3.00 (2.00, 5.00)	3.00 (2.00, 5.00)	3.00 (2.00, 5.00)
mean (sd)	3.51 ± 1.51	3.53 ± 1.51	3.49 ± 1.52
maximum	6.00	6.00	6.00
Employment			
Full-time	325 (37)	338 (37)	314 (35)
Homemaker	58 (7)	75 (8)	81 (9)
Other	16 (2)	26 (3)	20 (2)
Part-time	78 (9)	75 (8)	99 (11)
Permanently disabled	80 (9)	79 (9)	78 (9)
Retired	185 (21)	188 (20)	193 (21)
Student	32 (4)	44 (5)	34 (4)
Temporarily laid off	19 (2)	24 (3)	19 (2)
Unemployed	82 (9)	69 (8)	69 (8)
FamilyIncomeCont			
minimum	1.00	1.00	1.00
median (IQR)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)
mean (sd)	2.97 ± 1.30	3.04 ± 1.32	2.87 ± 1.33
maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00
Unknown/Missing	83 (9.49%)	84 (9.15%)	99 (10.92%)
FamilyIncomeContNA			
minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00
median (IQR)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)
mean (sd)	0.09 ± 0.29	0.09 ± 0.29	0.11 ± 0.31
maximum	1.00	1.00	1.00
Party3			
Ind	241 (28)	233 (25)	232 (26)
Dem	318 (36)	315 (34)	328 (36)
OtherNotSure	81 (9)	90 (10)	79 (9)
Rep	235 (27)	280 (31)	268 (30)
IdeologyCont			
minimum	1.00	1.00	1.00
median (IQR)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)
mean (sd)	2.95 ± 1.24	3.06 ± 1.29	3.03 ± 1.24
maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00
Unknown/Missing	62 (7.09%)	83 (9.04%)	79 (8.71%)
IdeologyContNA			
minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00
median (IQR)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)
mean (sd)	0.07 ± 0.26	0.09 ± 0.29	0.09 ± 0.28
maximum	1.00	1.00	1.00
Age			
minimum	18.00	18.00	18.00
median (IQR)	50.00 (36.00, 62.00)	50.00 (35.00, 62.00)	49.00 (35.00, 63.00)
mean (sd)	49.15 ± 16.64	49.00 ± 16.84	49.22 ± 16.91
maximum	94.00	88.00	95.00
treat			
Control	875 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Minorities	0 (0)	918 (100)	0 (0)
Poor	0 (0)	0 (0)	907 (100)
Unknown/Missing	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)

A.3 Survey wave 2




Figure A3: Baseline agreement with policy proposals (Wave 2)

Note: Sample restricted to Wave 2 control-group respondents ($n = 1,088$).




Figure A4: Covariate balance plot across the two treatment arms in Wave 2 survey experiment

Table A6: Covariate balance table across the two treatment arms in survey wave 2

	0 (N = 1088)	1 (N = 1095)
Gender		
Female	636 (59)	600 (55)
Male	447 (41)	487 (45)
Non-binary	0 (0)	0 (0)
Other	0 (0)	0 (0)
Prefer not to answer	0 (0)	0 (0)
Unknown/Missing	5 (0.46%)	8 (0.73%)
Race		
White	904 (83)	890 (81)
Asian	23 (2)	11 (1)
Black	88 (8)	110 (10)
Hispanic	29 (3)	32 (3)
Middle Eastern	0 (0)	1 (0)
Native American	13 (1)	11 (1)
Other	12 (1)	22 (2)
Two or more races	19 (2)	18 (2)
EducationCont		
minimum	1.00	1.00
median (IQR)	3.00 (2.00, 5.00)	3.00 (2.00, 5.00)
mean (sd)	3.55 ± 1.51	3.59 ± 1.54
maximum	6.00	6.00
Employment		
Full-time	373 (34)	415 (38)
Homemaker	88 (8)	73 (7)
Other	21 (2)	29 (3)
Part-time	107 (10)	94 (9)
Permanently disabled	103 (9)	96 (9)
Retired	253 (23)	258 (24)
Student	39 (4)	43 (4)
Temporarily laid off	18 (2)	22 (2)
Unemployed	86 (8)	65 (6)
FamilyIncomeCont		
minimum	1.00	1.00
median (IQR)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)
mean (sd)	3.02 ± 1.31	3.00 ± 1.29
maximum	5.00	5.00
Unknown/Missing	106 (9.74%)	109 (9.95%)
FamilyIncomeContNA		
minimum	0.00	0.00
median (IQR)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)
mean (sd)	0.10 ± 0.30	0.10 ± 0.30
maximum	1.00	1.00
Party3		
Ind	301 (28)	280 (26)
Dem	395 (36)	402 (37)
OtherNotSure	79 (7)	88 (8)
Rep	313 (29)	325 (30)
IdeologyCont		
minimum	1.00	1.00
median (IQR)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)	3.00 (2.00, 4.00)
mean (sd)	3.00 ± 1.26	3.03 ± 1.29
maximum	5.00	5.00
Unknown/Missing	72 (6.62%)	76 (6.94%)
IdeologyContNA		
minimum	0.00	0.00
median (IQR)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)
mean (sd)	0.07 ± 0.25	0.07 ± 0.25
maximum	1.00	1.00
Age		
minimum	18.00	19.00
median (IQR)	51.00 (38.00, 64.00)	53.00 (38.50, 64.00)
mean (sd)	50.74 ± 16.31	51.46 ± 16.09
maximum	87.00	94.00
State		
Illinois	185 (17)	190 (17)
Kentucky	181 (17)	180 (16)
Missouri	182 (17)	179 (16)
North Carolina	178 (16)	182 (17)
Tennessee	176 (16)	174 (16)
Virginia	186 (17)	190 (17)
infor treat		
minimum	0.00	1.00
median (IQR)	0.00 (0.00, 0.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)
mean (sd)	0.00 ± 0.00	1.00 ± 0.00
maximum	0.00	1.00
Unknown/Missing	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)




Figure A5: Wave 2 treatment effects on policy agreement

Note: Estimated effect of exposing respondents to the actual number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in their state on agreement with each policy ($n = 2,183$). Ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; each outcome is regressed on the information treatment indicator only (no controls). Points are ordered by estimated effect; bars show 95% confidence intervals.

	State mask man- date	State testing work- ers and stu- dents	State closure of indoor dining stores	State closure of retail stores	Do not sup- port state busi- ness clo- sures	Fed mask man- date	Fed testing work- ers and stu- dents	Fed closure of resta- urants	Fed closure of retail	Fed contact- tracing	Do not sup- port fed in- volve- ment
infor_treat: 1	0.010 (0.020)	0.025 (0.020)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.021)	0.009 (0.020)

Table A7: Wave 2 information treatment (treatment only)

Note: Same specification as Figure A5: ordinary least squares with the information treatment entered as a factor, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, and no additional covariates (randomization balance). Eleven policy outcomes (State contact-tracing omitted to match the covariate-adjusted table below and save width); intercepts omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	State mask mandate	State testing workers and students	State closure of indoor dining	State closure of retail stores	Do not support state business closures	Fed mask mandate	Fed testing workers and students	Fed closure of restaurants	Fed closure of retail	Fed contact- tracing	Do not support fed involvement
infor_treat: 1	0.017 (0.018)	0.030 (0.020)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.019)	0.003 (0.019)	0.007 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.000 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.018)
Party3: Dem	0.120*** (0.023)	0.137*** (0.027)	0.137*** (0.029)	0.111*** (0.031)	-0.118*** (0.026)	0.154*** (0.028)	0.120*** (0.028)	0.122*** (0.031)	0.091*** (0.026)	0.158*** (0.030)	-0.136*** (0.023)
Party3: OtherNotSure	-0.108** (0.046)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.029 (0.051)	0.031 (0.048)	0.109** (0.049)	-0.106** (0.050)	-0.097* (0.049)	-0.025 (0.045)	0.071 (0.045)	-0.071 (0.045)	0.117** (0.049)
Party3: Rep	-0.081** (0.032)	-0.032 (0.033)	-0.132*** (0.030)	-0.062*** (0.026)	0.158*** (0.031)	-0.144*** (0.032)	-0.078** (0.033)	-0.086*** (0.028)	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.063** (0.031)	0.076** (0.032)
IdeologyCont	-0.148*** (0.009)	-0.113*** (0.011)	-0.157*** (0.011)	-0.116*** (0.011)	0.154*** (0.010)	-0.150*** (0.010)	-0.132*** (0.011)	-0.138*** (0.011)	-0.101*** (0.010)	-0.146*** (0.011)	0.137*** (0.009)
IdeologyContNA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
EducationCont	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)	0.011 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.018** (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)
Employment:	0.011 (0.007)	0.019 (0.009)	0.036 (0.009)	0.014 (0.009)	-0.067 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.052 (0.009)	0.078* (0.009)	0.056 (0.009)	0.017 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)
Homemaker	0.041 (0.019)	0.074 (0.027)	0.045 (0.027)	0.042 (0.027)	0.047 (0.027)	0.043 (0.027)	0.047 (0.027)	0.046 (0.027)	0.041 (0.027)	0.045 (0.027)	0.041 (0.027)
Employment: Other	0.019 (0.062)	0.074 (0.072)	0.040 (0.075)	-0.022 (0.072)	-0.030 (0.071)	0.038 (0.073)	0.059 (0.079)	0.047 (0.085)	-0.024 (0.085)	0.045 (0.085)	-0.038 (0.069)
Employment: Part-time	0.004 (0.033)	0.025 (0.037)	0.028 (0.039)	0.004 (0.040)	-0.020 (0.037)	0.011 (0.038)	0.078** (0.038)	0.027 (0.040)	-0.012 (0.040)	0.080** (0.038)	-0.032 (0.034)
Employment:	0.043 (0.034)	0.050 (0.042)	0.059** (0.037)	0.053 (0.039)	-0.054 (0.035)	0.047 (0.035)	0.062 (0.041)	0.063 (0.039)	0.020 (0.037)	0.114** (0.039)	-0.050 (0.034)
Permanently disabled	0.038 (0.025)	0.112*** (0.027)	0.053*** (0.025)	-0.022 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.025)	0.050* (0.025)	0.074*** (0.028)	0.008 (0.027)	-0.061*** (0.028)	0.069** (0.028)	-0.033 (0.025)
Employment: Retired	0.034 (0.040)	0.039 (0.050)	0.000 (0.058)	-0.012 (0.053)	-0.039 (0.049)	-0.024 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.058)	0.062 (0.060)	0.067 (0.063)	0.022 (0.055)	0.017 (0.048)
Employment: Student	-0.046 (0.065)	0.053 (0.079)	0.026 (0.078)	0.094 (0.081)	-0.140** (0.068)	0.035 (0.062)	0.074 (0.080)	0.007 (0.079)	0.042 (0.074)	0.006 (0.073)	-0.089 (0.062)
Temporarily laid off	0.114*** (0.008)	0.077 (0.009)	0.111** (0.009)	0.071 (0.009)	-0.170*** (0.008)	0.126*** (0.009)	0.118** (0.009)	0.143*** (0.010)	0.078 (0.009)	0.141*** (0.009)	-0.127*** (0.008)
Employment:	0.043 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)	0.008 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.016** (0.009)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.008 (0.009)	0.026*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.008)
FamilyIncomeCont	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
FamilyIncomeContNA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Race: Asian	0.150** (0.067)	0.039 (0.087)	0.040 (0.090)	0.066 (0.092)	-0.141** (0.067)	0.005 (0.092)	0.053 (0.088)	0.080 (0.091)	0.000 (0.085)	-0.065 (0.090)	-0.091 (0.067)
Race: Black	0.091** (0.026)	0.014 (0.034)	-0.040 (0.045)	-0.094* (0.042)	-0.023 (0.038)	0.045 (0.033)	0.053 (0.037)	0.009 (0.045)	-0.018 (0.041)	-0.094** (0.044)	-0.048* (0.028)
Race: Hispanic	0.164*** (0.062)	0.038 (0.062)	-0.175** (0.077)	0.113** (0.065)	0.106 (0.063)	-0.142** (0.062)	0.035 (0.062)	-0.165* (0.062)	-0.103 (0.062)	0.075 (0.062)	0.086 (0.062)
Race: Middle Eastern	0.111*** (0.030)	0.144*** (0.035)	0.277*** (0.036)	0.534*** (0.038)	-0.170*** (0.032)	0.134*** (0.032)	0.234*** (0.036)	0.421*** (0.038)	0.634*** (0.036)	0.309*** (0.037)	-0.122*** (0.030)
Race: Native American	-0.103 (0.087)	-0.034 (0.112)	-0.240** (0.097)	0.009 (0.097)	0.163 (0.106)	-0.124 (0.105)	-0.237** (0.101)	-0.198** (0.093)	0.024 (0.090)	-0.179* (0.089)	0.108 (0.104)
Race: Other	-0.219** (0.087)	-0.184* (0.100)	-0.082 (0.094)	-0.155** (0.075)	0.188** (0.090)	-0.238*** (0.090)	-0.191** (0.096)	-0.156* (0.087)	-0.170*** (0.080)	-0.057 (0.073)	0.154* (0.085)
Race: Two or more races	-0.066 (0.065)	-0.120 (0.082)	-0.011 (0.083)	-0.075 (0.063)	-0.026 (0.063)	-0.050 (0.069)	-0.111 (0.080)	-0.002 (0.075)	-0.008 (0.080)	-0.009 (0.073)	0.050 (0.061)
Gender: Male	-0.053*** (0.019)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.057*** (0.020)	0.031 (0.019)	-0.048** (0.019)	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.030 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.021)	0.058*** (0.019)
State: Kentucky	-0.033 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.035)	-0.005 (0.033)	0.044 (0.034)	0.002 (0.036)	-0.052 (0.032)	-0.040 (0.034)	0.005 (0.034)	0.056* (0.034)	0.039 (0.035)	0.055* (0.031)
State: Missouri	-0.069** (0.030)	-0.058* (0.035)	-0.009 (0.033)	-0.025 (0.034)	0.004 (0.032)	-0.013 (0.030)	-0.023 (0.034)	0.006 (0.034)	0.009 (0.034)	0.042 (0.034)	0.056* (0.030)
State: North Carolina	-0.033 (0.031)	0.033 (0.034)	0.047 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.034)	-0.036 (0.033)	-0.004 (0.032)	0.007 (0.033)	0.010 (0.036)	0.010 (0.033)	0.055 (0.037)	0.019 (0.031)
State: Tennessee	-0.041 (0.030)	0.005 (0.034)	0.028 (0.034)	0.044 (0.034)	0.012 (0.035)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.020 (0.035)	0.007 (0.034)	0.005 (0.035)	0.050 (0.035)	0.058* (0.030)
State: Virginia	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.034)	0.002 (0.034)	0.004 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.031)	-0.034 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.031)	0.031 (0.036)	0.058* (0.030)

Table A8: Wave 2 information treatment with covariates

A.4 Survey wave 3




Figure A6: Covariate balance plot across the three treatment arms in Wave 3 survey experiment

Table A9: Covariate balance table across the three treatment arms in survey wave 3

	control (N = 620)	affects blacks (N = 625)	affects whites (N = 617)
Gender			
Female	332 (54)	352 (56)	353 (57)
Male	284 (46)	272 (44)	261 (43)
Unknown/Missing	4 (0.65%)	1 (0.16%)	3 (0.49%)
Race			
White	511 (82)	526 (84)	508 (82)
Asian	8 (1)	9 (1)	12 (2)
Black	57 (9)	51 (8)	55 (9)
Hispanic	20 (3)	13 (2)	14 (2)
Middle Eastern	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)
Native American	10 (2)	6 (1)	4 (1)
Other	8 (1)	11 (2)	12 (2)
Two or more races	6 (1)	8 (1)	12 (2)
Education			
No HS	35 (6)	14 (2)	19 (3)
2-year	56 (9)	64 (10)	66 (11)
4-year	142 (23)	141 (23)	119 (19)
High school graduate	179 (29)	182 (29)	200 (32)
Post-grad	99 (16)	91 (15)	72 (12)
Some college	109 (18)	133 (21)	141 (23)
Employment			
Full-time	232 (37)	199 (32)	231 (37)
Homemaker	43 (7)	52 (8)	43 (7)
Other	13 (2)	16 (3)	12 (2)
Part-time	57 (9)	53 (8)	61 (10)
Permanently disabled	54 (9)	65 (10)	59 (10)
Retired	153 (25)	164 (26)	146 (24)
Student	17 (3)	20 (3)	16 (3)
Temporarily laid off	8 (1)	12 (2)	12 (2)
Unemployed	43 (7)	44 (7)	37 (6)
Family income			
\$120,000 or more	81 (13)	70 (11)	70 (11)
\$20,000 - \$39,999	121 (20)	121 (19)	143 (23)
\$40,000 - \$59,999	107 (17)	112 (18)	109 (18)
\$60,000 - \$119,999	163 (26)	171 (27)	160 (26)
Less than \$20,000	87 (14)	80 (13)	89 (14)
Prefer not to say	61 (10)	71 (11)	46 (7)
Party			
Independent	75 (12)	86 (14)	74 (12)
Lean Democrat	71 (11)	56 (9)	53 (9)
Lean Republican	62 (10)	60 (10)	53 (9)
Not sure	16 (3)	24 (4)	14 (2)
Not very strong Democrat	57 (9)	55 (9)	53 (9)
Not very strong Republican	51 (8)	66 (11)	52 (8)
Strong Democrat	171 (28)	154 (25)	172 (28)
Strong Republican	117 (19)	124 (20)	146 (24)
Ideology			
Moderate	177 (29)	181 (29)	160 (26)
Conservative	102 (16)	127 (20)	134 (22)
Liberal	112 (18)	100 (16)	98 (16)
Not sure	33 (5)	46 (7)	42 (7)
Very conservative	103 (17)	84 (13)	99 (16)
Very liberal	93 (15)	87 (14)	84 (14)
Age			
minimum	18.00	19.00	18.00
median (IQR)	53.50 (39.00, 64.00)	54.00 (41.00, 65.00)	54.00 (40.00, 64.00)
mean (sd)	52.00 ± 16.20	53.20 ± 15.51	52.27 ± 15.75
maximum	92.00	94.00	89.00

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.047 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.030)	-0.019 (0.030)	-0.060** (0.030)	-0.059* (0.030)	-0.051* (0.030)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.023 (0.030)	0.002 (0.030)	0.016 (0.030)	-0.026 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.030)	-0.018 (0.030)
Employment: Homemaker	0.004 (0.053)	0.055 (0.053)	0.046 (0.052)	0.045 (0.052)	0.053 (0.053)	0.042 (0.053)
Employment: Other	0.129 (0.084)	0.174** (0.088)	0.033 (0.087)	0.223*** (0.086)	0.192** (0.083)	0.243*** (0.085)
Employment: Part-time	0.128*** (0.045)	0.112** (0.046)	0.025 (0.046)	0.152*** (0.046)	0.111** (0.045)	0.103** (0.046)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.064 (0.050)	0.130*** (0.049)	0.076 (0.047)	0.057 (0.048)	0.100** (0.049)	0.092* (0.050)
Employment: Retired	0.001 (0.034)	-0.110*** (0.033)	-0.064* (0.034)	0.012 (0.034)	0.005 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.034)
Employment: Student	0.198*** (0.069)	0.225*** (0.074)	0.109 (0.076)	0.227*** (0.079)	0.200*** (0.071)	0.177** (0.074)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.155* (0.090)	0.275*** (0.087)	0.164* (0.084)	0.294*** (0.085)	0.177** (0.088)	0.151* (0.092)
Employment: Unemployed	0.104* (0.055)	0.216*** (0.054)	0.156*** (0.051)	0.194*** (0.056)	0.233*** (0.050)	0.214*** (0.053)
EducationCont	0.049*** (0.009)	0.057*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.009)	0.068*** (0.009)	0.037*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.009)
FamilyIncomeCont	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.039*** (0.012)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.161*** (0.056)	-0.226*** (0.053)	-0.248*** (0.055)	-0.209*** (0.054)	-0.192*** (0.054)	-0.323*** (0.054)

Table A10: Wave 3 main effects (white respondents)

Notes: Same canonical Wave 3 specification as the main summary table (employment, education, family-income), restricted to white respondents as a robustness check. Race is omitted because the sample is all-white. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; intercept omitted from display. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.027)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.050* (0.027)	-0.058** (0.028)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.003 (0.027)	0.032 (0.027)	0.031 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.028)	0.002 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.027)
Employment: Homemaker	-0.019 (0.048)	0.029 (0.048)	0.048 (0.046)	0.032 (0.047)	0.059 (0.047)	0.050 (0.048)
Employment: Other	0.107 (0.074)	0.093 (0.083)	0.040 (0.078)	0.174** (0.079)	0.189*** (0.072)	0.220*** (0.077)
Employment: Part-time	0.120*** (0.040)	0.106** (0.042)	0.032 (0.041)	0.152*** (0.042)	0.111*** (0.041)	0.110*** (0.041)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.094** (0.044)	0.137*** (0.044)	0.086** (0.042)	0.051 (0.045)	0.115*** (0.044)	0.111** (0.045)
Employment: Retired	0.014 (0.031)	-0.114*** (0.031)	-0.061** (0.031)	0.006 (0.031)	0.021 (0.031)	0.011 (0.031)
Employment: Student	0.226*** (0.057)	0.246*** (0.062)	0.136** (0.063)	0.216*** (0.068)	0.228*** (0.060)	0.181*** (0.064)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.156* (0.083)	0.227*** (0.085)	0.119 (0.083)	0.287*** (0.079)	0.182*** (0.083)	0.147* (0.086)
Employment: Unemployed	0.120** (0.047)	0.193*** (0.047)	0.131*** (0.045)	0.175*** (0.049)	0.188*** (0.046)	0.174*** (0.048)
EducationCont	0.048*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.059*** (0.008)	0.039*** (0.008)	0.048*** (0.008)
FamilyIncomeCont	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.030*** (0.011)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.000 (0.010)	-0.034*** (0.011)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.160*** (0.050)	-0.208*** (0.048)	-0.244*** (0.050)	-0.205*** (0.049)	-0.151*** (0.049)	-0.300*** (0.049)
Race: Asian	0.109 (0.085)	0.099 (0.088)	0.154** (0.075)	-0.108 (0.085)	0.129* (0.077)	-0.051 (0.088)
Race: Black	0.159*** (0.036)	0.169*** (0.039)	0.129*** (0.036)	0.156*** (0.042)	0.104*** (0.037)	0.040 (0.040)
Race: Hispanic	0.062 (0.068)	0.074 (0.070)	0.065 (0.066)	0.098 (0.068)	0.007 (0.073)	-0.088 (0.072)
Race: Middle Eastern	0.482*** (0.029)	0.588*** (0.029)	0.435*** (0.029)	0.617*** (0.029)	0.488*** (0.029)	0.568*** (0.029)
Race: Native American	-0.275*** (0.106)	-0.154 (0.101)	-0.048 (0.108)	-0.019 (0.117)	-0.141 (0.109)	-0.197* (0.110)
Race: Other	-0.091 (0.090)	-0.156* (0.089)	-0.079 (0.085)	-0.221*** (0.080)	-0.166* (0.090)	-0.307*** (0.080)
Race: Two or more races	0.160** (0.079)	0.153 (0.094)	0.137 (0.086)	0.213** (0.086)	0.098 (0.088)	0.147* (0.088)

Table A11: Wave 3 main effects (full sample)

Notes: This is the full-coefficient version of the main summary (Table 2, Wave 3 main-effects panel): full sample with race indicators (white omitted). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; intercept omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.017 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.010 (0.035)	-0.055 (0.037)	-0.083** (0.033)	-0.051 (0.035)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.001 (0.034)	0.011 (0.036)	0.051 (0.034)	0.013 (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.035)
Republican	-0.312*** (0.046)	-0.442*** (0.040)	-0.256*** (0.047)	-0.312*** (0.044)	-0.442*** (0.044)	-0.362*** (0.044)
Employment: Homemaker	0.020 (0.052)	0.076 (0.049)	0.059 (0.051)	0.060 (0.051)	0.072 (0.051)	0.059 (0.051)
Employment: Other	0.090 (0.075)	0.128* (0.077)	0.000 (0.085)	0.185*** (0.084)	0.152** (0.069)	0.205*** (0.076)
Employment: Part-time	0.079* (0.043)	0.051 (0.044)	-0.013 (0.044)	0.107** (0.044)	0.056 (0.043)	0.054 (0.043)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.061 (0.047)	0.127*** (0.045)	0.073 (0.045)	0.054 (0.045)	0.099** (0.044)	0.090* (0.046)
Employment: Retired	0.016 (0.032)	-0.090*** (0.030)	-0.052 (0.032)	0.027 (0.032)	0.024 (0.032)	0.005 (0.032)
Employment: Student	0.126* (0.065)	0.134** (0.068)	0.050 (0.073)	0.157** (0.074)	0.116* (0.068)	0.102 (0.067)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.093 (0.079)	0.199** (0.080)	0.109 (0.081)	0.228*** (0.085)	0.107 (0.081)	0.087 (0.097)
Employment: Unemployed	0.073 (0.053)	0.176*** (0.054)	0.132*** (0.051)	0.164*** (0.055)	0.196*** (0.051)	0.182*** (0.055)
EducationCont	0.031*** (0.009)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.018** (0.009)	0.049*** (0.009)	0.015* (0.009)	0.023*** (0.009)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.002 (0.011)	-0.027** (0.011)	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.124** (0.054)	-0.180*** (0.050)	-0.218*** (0.055)	-0.173*** (0.053)	-0.151*** (0.051)	-0.285*** (0.052)
w3_treataffects_blacks × Republican	-0.050 (0.062)	0.025 (0.054)	0.003 (0.064)	0.019 (0.059)	0.118* (0.061)	0.038 (0.061)
w3_treataffects_whites × Republican	-0.015 (0.062)	0.043 (0.056)	-0.057 (0.063)	-0.059 (0.059)	0.059 (0.060)	0.016 (0.061)

Table A12: Wave 3 treatment × Republican (white respondents)

Notes: Same canonical Wave 3 specification as the main summary table's treatment × Republican rows, restricted to white respondents as a robustness check. Race is omitted because the sample is all-white. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; intercept omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	0.001 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.032)	0.006 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.032)	-0.068** (0.030)	-0.053* (0.031)
w3_treataffects_whites	0.013 (0.030)	0.044 (0.031)	0.064** (0.030)	0.006 (0.032)	0.003 (0.029)	0.005 (0.031)
Republican	-0.295*** (0.044)	-0.411*** (0.038)	-0.229*** (0.045)	-0.296*** (0.049)	-0.414*** (0.042)	-0.341*** (0.043)
Employment: Homemaker	-0.002 (0.047)	0.050 (0.044)	0.062 (0.045)	0.062 (0.046)	0.078* (0.046)	0.068 (0.047)
Employment: Other	0.073 (0.068)	0.053 (0.076)	0.111 (0.077)	0.140 (0.078)	0.156** (0.062)	0.186** (0.071)
Employment: Part-time	0.079** (0.039)	0.055 (0.039)	0.000 (0.040)	0.112*** (0.040)	0.065* (0.039)	0.068* (0.039)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.090** (0.042)	0.133*** (0.041)	0.083** (0.041)	0.047 (0.043)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.108** (0.042)
Employment: Retired	0.029 (0.029)	-0.094*** (0.028)	-0.049 (0.030)	0.022 (0.029)	0.039 (0.029)	0.027 (0.029)
Employment: Student	0.180*** (0.054)	0.184*** (0.060)	0.097 (0.062)	0.168*** (0.065)	0.169*** (0.059)	0.128** (0.058)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.103 (0.075)	0.161** (0.079)	0.072 (0.081)	0.232*** (0.079)	0.122 (0.077)	0.090 (0.090)
Employment: Unemployed	0.104** (0.046)	0.173*** (0.048)	0.119*** (0.044)	0.160*** (0.048)	0.169*** (0.047)	0.157*** (0.049)
EducationCont	0.033*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.021** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.004 (0.010)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)	-0.029*** (0.010)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.128*** (0.049)	-0.169*** (0.046)	-0.219*** (0.049)	-0.174*** (0.048)	-0.115** (0.047)	-0.267*** (0.048)
Race: Asian	0.056 (0.083)	0.033 (0.087)	0.110 (0.076)	-0.160* (0.085)	0.071 (0.080)	-0.106 (0.090)
Race: Black	0.064* (0.036)	0.052 (0.040)	0.052 (0.036)	0.064 (0.042)	-0.001 (0.038)	-0.059 (0.041)
Race: Hispanic	0.005 (0.068)	0.004 (0.069)	0.019 (0.067)	0.043 (0.070)	-0.055 (0.073)	-0.147** (0.068)
Race: Middle Eastern	0.344*** (0.030)	0.431*** (0.031)	0.336*** (0.030)	0.494*** (0.032)	0.361*** (0.031)	0.440*** (0.032)
Race: Native American	-0.293** (0.118)	-0.177 (0.116)	-0.063 (0.120)	-0.037 (0.115)	-0.164 (0.125)	-0.217* (0.114)
Race: Other	-0.167* (0.091)	-0.251*** (0.086)	-0.142* (0.082)	-0.296*** (0.079)	-0.251*** (0.092)	-0.387*** (0.083)
Race: Two or more races	0.060 (0.081)	0.028 (0.094)	0.052 (0.087)	0.112 (0.087)	-0.014 (0.088)	0.041 (0.090)
w3_treataffects_blacks × Republican	-0.066 (0.059)	0.013 (0.052)	-0.022 (0.061)	-0.013 (0.056)	0.104* (0.059)	0.019 (0.058)
w3_treataffects_whites × Republican	-0.005 (0.060)	0.024 (0.053)	-0.068 (0.060)	-0.041 (0.056)	0.060 (0.058)	-0.001 (0.058)

Table A13: Wave 3 treatment × Republican (full sample)

Notes: This is the full-coefficient version of the main summary (Table 2, Wave 3 interaction panel): full sample with race indicators (white omitted). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; intercept omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.046 (0.031)	-0.028 (0.031)	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.058* (0.031)	-0.056* (0.030)	-0.051 (0.031)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.026 (0.031)	0.001 (0.031)	0.019 (0.030)	-0.030 (0.031)	-0.010 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.031)

Table A14: Wave 3 treatment arms only (white respondents)

Note: Treatment arms only; white respondents; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.026 (0.028)	-0.015 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.027)	-0.041 (0.028)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.054* (0.028)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.007 (0.028)	0.030 (0.028)	0.033 (0.027)	-0.026 (0.028)	-0.000 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.028)
Race: Asian	0.136 (0.084)	0.152* (0.089)	0.179** (0.076)	-0.066 (0.093)	0.150* (0.080)	-0.040 (0.094)
Race: Black	0.166*** (0.036)	0.199*** (0.038)	0.155*** (0.036)	0.168*** (0.040)	0.115*** (0.037)	0.068* (0.040)
Race: Hispanic	0.091 (0.070)	0.117 (0.072)	0.092 (0.068)	0.133* (0.072)	0.028 (0.072)	-0.071 (0.074)
Race: Middle Eastern	0.426*** (0.020)	0.520*** (0.021)	0.404*** (0.020)	0.538*** (0.020)	0.422*** (0.020)	0.475*** (0.021)
Race: Native American	-0.240** (0.108)	-0.096 (0.111)	-0.007 (0.109)	0.014 (0.114)	-0.110 (0.114)	-0.160 (0.109)
Race: Other	-0.071 (0.091)	-0.114 (0.089)	-0.064 (0.089)	-0.188** (0.083)	-0.155* (0.090)	-0.297*** (0.080)
Race: Two or more races	0.181** (0.084)	0.188** (0.092)	0.154* (0.084)	0.252*** (0.088)	0.122 (0.088)	0.174** (0.088)

Table A15: Wave 3 treatment arms with race indicators (full sample)

Note: Treatment arms and race indicators (white omitted); full sample; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.035 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.027)	-0.047* (0.026)	-0.047* (0.025)	-0.039 (0.026)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.001 (0.028)	0.023 (0.025)	0.027 (0.027)	-0.010 (0.027)	0.007 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.026)
Party3: Dem	0.085*** (0.030)	0.148*** (0.030)	0.118*** (0.030)	0.151*** (0.033)	0.136*** (0.027)	0.135*** (0.030)
Party3: OtherNotSure	-0.156*** (0.054)	-0.095** (0.048)	-0.111** (0.051)	-0.065 (0.052)	-0.104** (0.048)	-0.114** (0.049)
Party3: Rep	-0.141*** (0.035)	-0.083*** (0.031)	-0.049 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.078** (0.034)	-0.053 (0.033)
IdeologyCont	-0.107*** (0.013)	-0.171*** (0.011)	-0.117*** (0.012)	-0.156*** (0.012)	-0.157*** (0.011)	-0.150*** (0.012)
IdeologyContNA	-0.298*** (0.069)	-0.452*** (0.066)	-0.432*** (0.068)	-0.495*** (0.070)	-0.469*** (0.063)	-0.492*** (0.067)
EducationCont	0.019** (0.008)	0.015** (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)	0.030*** (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)
Employment: Homemaker	-0.008 (0.053)	0.049 (0.048)	0.019 (0.050)	0.061 (0.050)	0.020 (0.048)	0.026 (0.049)
Employment: Other	0.088 (0.077)	0.125 (0.078)	-0.005 (0.087)	0.199** (0.083)	0.142** (0.068)	0.204*** (0.072)
Employment: Part-time	0.077* (0.040)	0.050 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.042)	0.113*** (0.040)	0.047 (0.040)	0.049 (0.041)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.033 (0.046)	0.095** (0.041)	0.043 (0.044)	0.029 (0.042)	0.063 (0.041)	0.057 (0.043)
Employment: Retired	0.034 (0.031)	-0.049* (0.026)	-0.036 (0.030)	0.069** (0.029)	0.053* (0.028)	0.035 (0.029)
Employment: Student	0.049 (0.061)	0.022 (0.058)	-0.037 (0.064)	0.065 (0.067)	0.006 (0.058)	0.002 (0.057)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.078 (0.074)	0.175** (0.083)	0.097 (0.076)	0.221*** (0.080)	0.083 (0.077)	0.070 (0.088)
Employment: Unemployed	0.057 (0.053)	0.159*** (0.053)	0.123** (0.048)	0.161*** (0.054)	0.180*** (0.050)	0.172*** (0.051)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.002 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.018* (0.011)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.010)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.094* (0.050)	-0.126*** (0.044)	-0.172*** (0.051)	-0.132*** (0.046)	-0.096** (0.046)	-0.236*** (0.048)
Gender: Male	-0.040* (0.024)	-0.035 (0.021)	-0.086*** (0.023)	0.012 (0.023)	-0.088*** (0.022)	-0.052** (0.023)

Table A16: Wave 3 expanded covariates (white respondents)

Note: Expanded covariates; white respondents (race term omitted); heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.019 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.040* (0.023)	-0.048** (0.024)
w3_treataffects_whites	0.015 (0.025)	0.049** (0.023)	0.041 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.025)	0.017 (0.023)	0.003 (0.024)
Party3: Dem	0.088*** (0.027)	0.149*** (0.028)	0.110*** (0.027)	0.146*** (0.030)	0.136*** (0.026)	0.135*** (0.028)
Party3: OtherNotSure	-0.151*** (0.049)	-0.062 (0.044)	-0.088* (0.047)	-0.045 (0.047)	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.113** (0.044)
Party3: Rep	-0.135*** (0.033)	-0.083*** (0.029)	-0.043 (0.032)	-0.022 (0.031)	-0.065** (0.032)	-0.061* (0.031)
IdeologyCont	-0.102*** (0.012)	-0.160*** (0.010)	-0.114*** (0.011)	-0.147*** (0.011)	-0.152*** (0.010)	-0.144*** (0.011)
IdeologyContNA	-0.272*** (0.058)	-0.433*** (0.058)	-0.417*** (0.057)	-0.454*** (0.060)	-0.479*** (0.057)	-0.473*** (0.058)
EducationCont	0.022*** (0.008)	0.016** (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)
Employment: Homemaker	-0.029 (0.048)	0.029 (0.043)	0.025 (0.045)	0.053 (0.046)	0.037 (0.045)	0.052 (0.045)
Employment: Other	0.078 (0.070)	0.057 (0.075)	0.015 (0.077)	0.153** (0.075)	0.156** (0.061)	0.192*** (0.065)
Employment: Part-time	0.075** (0.036)	0.049 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.038)	0.114*** (0.038)	0.055 (0.037)	0.063* (0.037)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.068* (0.041)	0.113*** (0.039)	0.061 (0.040)	0.034 (0.040)	0.088** (0.038)	0.086** (0.039)
Employment: Retired	0.043 (0.029)	-0.062** (0.025)	-0.037 (0.028)	0.054** (0.027)	0.062** (0.026)	0.050* (0.027)
Employment: Student	0.091* (0.052)	0.059 (0.053)	-0.001 (0.056)	0.060 (0.060)	0.050 (0.051)	0.012 (0.053)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.085 (0.069)	0.136* (0.079)	0.055 (0.076)	0.216*** (0.073)	0.096 (0.073)	0.070 (0.084)
Employment: Unemployed	0.092** (0.046)	0.156*** (0.047)	0.111*** (0.043)	0.153*** (0.047)	0.156*** (0.045)	0.149*** (0.046)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.006 (0.010)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.027*** (0.010)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.101** (0.046)	-0.115*** (0.042)	-0.179*** (0.047)	-0.129*** (0.044)	-0.063 (0.043)	-0.218*** (0.045)
Race: Asian	0.038 (0.085)	0.025 (0.084)	0.101 (0.083)	-0.136 (0.088)	0.063 (0.081)	-0.084 (0.098)
Race: Black	0.018 (0.037)	-0.004 (0.042)	0.003 (0.036)	0.017 (0.043)	-0.059 (0.038)	-0.112*** (0.040)
Race: Hispanic	-0.014 (0.064)	-0.026 (0.061)	0.001 (0.064)	0.029 (0.066)	-0.083 (0.064)	-0.164** (0.066)
Race: Middle Eastern	0.249*** (0.030)	0.264*** (0.030)	0.221*** (0.031)	0.316*** (0.032)	0.202*** (0.029)	0.274*** (0.031)
Race: Native American	-0.271** (0.110)	-0.125 (0.100)	-0.026 (0.111)	0.011 (0.104)	-0.113 (0.111)	-0.174 (0.107)
Race: Other	-0.109 (0.079)	-0.150** (0.072)	-0.069 (0.072)	-0.195*** (0.071)	-0.157** (0.079)	-0.294*** (0.076)
Race: Two or more races	0.033 (0.076)	-0.001 (0.076)	0.014 (0.084)	0.090 (0.069)	-0.055 (0.064)	0.007 (0.067)
Gender: Male	-0.043** (0.022)	-0.035* (0.020)	-0.085*** (0.021)	0.005 (0.021)	-0.081*** (0.020)	-0.037* (0.021)

Table A17: Wave 3 expanded covariates with race indicators (full sample)

Note: Expanded covariates including race; full sample; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.059* (0.036)	-0.017 (0.033)	0.013 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.036)	-0.018 (0.036)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.024 (0.037)	0.020 (0.034)	0.057 (0.037)	0.009 (0.035)	0.042 (0.037)	0.019 (0.036)
Democrat	0.145*** (0.043)	0.312*** (0.043)	0.293*** (0.041)	0.337*** (0.043)	0.360*** (0.035)	0.328*** (0.041)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.102*** (0.038)	-0.058* (0.033)	-0.119*** (0.041)	-0.101*** (0.036)	-0.093** (0.036)	-0.143*** (0.036)
EducationCont	0.024*** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.038*** (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)
Employment: Homemaker	0.011 (0.051)	0.073 (0.047)	0.058 (0.049)	0.052 (0.049)	0.061 (0.048)	0.061 (0.048)
Employment: Other	0.091 (0.075)	0.143* (0.079)	0.009 (0.091)	0.194** (0.084)	0.153** (0.069)	0.218*** (0.077)
Employment: Part-time	0.078* (0.041)	0.067 (0.041)	-0.007 (0.043)	0.110** (0.043)	0.056 (0.042)	0.068 (0.042)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.028 (0.044)	0.119*** (0.041)	0.065 (0.041)	0.029 (0.042)	0.064 (0.040)	0.092** (0.041)
Employment: Retired	0.004 (0.031)	-0.090*** (0.028)	-0.054* (0.031)	0.022 (0.030)	0.015 (0.030)	0.007 (0.030)
Employment: Student	0.107* (0.065)	0.119* (0.066)	0.038 (0.070)	0.138* (0.075)	0.098 (0.064)	0.092 (0.059)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.105 (0.079)	0.211** (0.087)	0.125 (0.080)	0.243*** (0.084)	0.116 (0.079)	0.102 (0.094)
Employment: Unemployed	0.085 (0.052)	0.226*** (0.052)	0.168*** (0.049)	0.194*** (0.053)	0.222*** (0.049)	0.236*** (0.052)
Party3: Dem	—	—	—	—	—	—
Party3: OtherNotSure	-0.140*** (0.054)	-0.046 (0.053)	-0.119** (0.053)	-0.053 (0.053)	-0.082 (0.053)	-0.094* (0.053)
Party3: Rep	-0.257*** (0.032)	-0.273*** (0.030)	-0.173*** (0.032)	-0.191*** (0.031)	-0.248*** (0.032)	-0.218*** (0.032)
w3_treataffects_blacks × Democrat	0.102* (0.055)	0.032 (0.054)	-0.043 (0.053)	-0.034 (0.058)	-0.059 (0.048)	-0.038 (0.053)
w3_treataffects_whites × Democrat	0.061 (0.055)	0.017 (0.053)	-0.076 (0.053)	-0.056 (0.057)	-0.095** (0.046)	-0.052 (0.053)

Table A18: Wave 3 treatment × Democrat (white respondents)

Note: Treatment × Democrat; white respondents; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.058* (0.034)	-0.023 (0.031)	-0.000 (0.035)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.034)	-0.046 (0.033)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.017 (0.035)	0.031 (0.032)	0.059* (0.035)	0.013 (0.033)	0.041 (0.035)	0.006 (0.034)
Democrat	0.128*** (0.039)	0.276*** (0.040)	0.251*** (0.039)	0.301*** (0.040)	0.328*** (0.035)	0.284*** (0.039)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.119*** (0.036)	-0.065** (0.032)	-0.144*** (0.038)	-0.122*** (0.033)	-0.100*** (0.034)	-0.146*** (0.034)
EducationCont	0.027*** (0.007)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.014* (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)
Employment: Homemaker	-0.007 (0.047)	0.056 (0.042)	0.067 (0.044)	0.049 (0.045)	0.073* (0.044)	0.078* (0.044)
Employment: Other	0.079 (0.068)	0.077 (0.080)	0.028 (0.080)	0.156* (0.080)	0.160** (0.065)	0.210*** (0.072)
Employment: Part-time	0.077** (0.037)	0.067* (0.038)	0.004 (0.039)	0.113*** (0.040)	0.060 (0.038)	0.081** (0.038)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.053 (0.039)	0.119*** (0.037)	0.067* (0.038)	0.016 (0.040)	0.063* (0.038)	0.101*** (0.039)
Employment: Retired	0.016 (0.029)	-0.096*** (0.027)	-0.054* (0.029)	0.013 (0.028)	0.024 (0.028)	0.025 (0.028)
Employment: Student	0.158*** (0.054)	0.164*** (0.059)	0.077 (0.061)	0.143** (0.067)	0.142** (0.056)	0.110** (0.053)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.112 (0.074)	0.173** (0.084)	0.086 (0.080)	0.243*** (0.077)	0.126* (0.076)	0.104 (0.085)
Employment: Unemployed	0.113** (0.045)	0.212*** (0.047)	0.147*** (0.043)	0.180*** (0.046)	0.179*** (0.045)	0.203*** (0.047)
Party3: Dem	-	-	-	-	-	-
Party3: OtherNotSure	-0.127*** (0.049)	-0.017 (0.048)	-0.089* (0.048)	-0.035 (0.048)	-0.062 (0.048)	-0.098** (0.048)
Party3: Rep	-0.243*** (0.030)	-0.257*** (0.028)	-0.161*** (0.031)	-0.187*** (0.029)	-0.227*** (0.030)	-0.216*** (0.030)
Race: Asian	0.070 (0.084)	0.050 (0.086)	0.124 (0.077)	-0.143* (0.083)	0.090 (0.080)	-0.091 (0.096)
Race: Black	-0.005 (0.036)	-0.033 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.036)	-0.019 (0.043)	-0.093** (0.037)	-0.138*** (0.039)
Race: Hispanic	0.011 (0.067)	0.002 (0.069)	0.022 (0.068)	0.043 (0.069)	-0.055 (0.068)	-0.145** (0.068)
Race: Middle Eastern	0.193*** (0.032)	0.216*** (0.034)	0.155*** (0.032)	0.295*** (0.038)	0.166*** (0.031)	0.231*** (0.035)
Race: Native American	-0.258** (0.119)	-0.104 (0.115)	-0.015 (0.122)	0.025 (0.120)	-0.102 (0.131)	-0.157 (0.116)
Race: Other	-0.142* (0.084)	-0.197** (0.077)	-0.098 (0.076)	-0.245*** (0.075)	-0.197** (0.086)	-0.335*** (0.080)
Race: Two or more races	0.019 (0.078)	-0.031 (0.089)	0.007 (0.087)	0.059 (0.080)	-0.073 (0.078)	-0.015 (0.077)
w3_treataffects_blacks × Democrat	0.124** (0.050)	0.062 (0.050)	0.016 (0.049)	0.021 (0.052)	-0.021 (0.046)	0.013 (0.050)
w3_treataffects_whites × Democrat	0.070 (0.050)	0.040 (0.049)	-0.051 (0.049)	-0.066 (0.052)	-0.074 (0.045)	-0.015 (0.050)

Table A19: Wave 3 treatment × Democrat with race indicators (full sample)

Note: Treatment × Democrat with race indicators; full sample; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.066* (0.035)	-0.029 (0.030)	0.007 (0.035)	-0.035 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.024 (0.033)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.027 (0.036)	0.010 (0.031)	0.046 (0.036)	0.001 (0.034)	0.031 (0.034)	0.010 (0.034)
Democrat	—	—	—	—	—	—
Party3: Dem	0.027 (0.044)	0.125*** (0.042)	0.155*** (0.042)	0.174*** (0.045)	0.182*** (0.035)	0.160*** (0.041)
Party3: OtherNotSure	-0.156*** (0.054)	-0.094* (0.048)	-0.112** (0.051)	-0.065 (0.052)	-0.104** (0.048)	-0.113** (0.049)
Party3: Rep	-0.139*** (0.036)	-0.082*** (0.031)	-0.051 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.033)	-0.080** (0.034)	-0.054* (0.033)
IdeologyCont	-0.107*** (0.013)	-0.171*** (0.011)	-0.117*** (0.012)	-0.155*** (0.012)	-0.156*** (0.011)	-0.150*** (0.012)
IdeologyContNA	-0.295*** (0.070)	-0.452*** (0.066)	-0.433*** (0.068)	-0.496*** (0.070)	-0.470*** (0.063)	-0.493*** (0.067)
EducationCont	0.020** (0.008)	0.015** (0.007)	0.000 (0.008)	0.030*** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)
Employment: Homemaker	-0.008 (0.053)	0.049 (0.048)	0.018 (0.050)	0.060 (0.050)	0.020 (0.048)	0.026 (0.049)
Employment: Other	0.090 (0.078)	0.126 (0.077)	-0.007 (0.088)	0.198** (0.084)	0.141** (0.068)	0.204*** (0.072)
Employment: Part-time	0.080** (0.040)	0.051 (0.039)	-0.026 (0.042)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.045 (0.040)	0.048 (0.041)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.032 (0.045)	0.095** (0.041)	0.043 (0.044)	0.030 (0.042)	0.064 (0.041)	0.058 (0.043)
Employment: Retired	0.034 (0.031)	-0.049* (0.026)	-0.035 (0.030)	0.069** (0.029)	0.054* (0.028)	0.035 (0.029)
Employment: Student	0.047 (0.061)	0.021 (0.058)	-0.036 (0.064)	0.066 (0.067)	0.008 (0.058)	0.003 (0.057)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.082 (0.075)	0.175** (0.083)	0.096 (0.075)	0.220*** (0.080)	0.081 (0.077)	0.068 (0.088)
Employment: Unemployed	0.057 (0.053)	0.159*** (0.053)	0.122** (0.048)	0.160*** (0.054)	0.179*** (0.050)	0.172*** (0.051)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.002 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.018* (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.011)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.096* (0.050)	-0.127*** (0.044)	-0.172*** (0.051)	-0.131*** (0.046)	-0.095** (0.046)	-0.235*** (0.048)
Gender: Male	-0.038 (0.024)	-0.035 (0.021)	-0.086*** (0.023)	0.011 (0.023)	-0.088*** (0.022)	-0.053** (0.023)
w3_treataffects_blacks × Democrat	0.097* (0.054)	0.030 (0.050)	-0.053 (0.053)	-0.038 (0.055)	-0.071 (0.045)	-0.046 (0.052)
w3_treataffects_whites × Democrat	0.081 (0.055)	0.040 (0.050)	-0.059 (0.053)	-0.034 (0.055)	-0.072 (0.045)	-0.033 (0.052)

Table A20: Wave 3 treatment × Democrat, expanded covariates (white respondents)

Note: Treatment × Democrat, expanded covariates; white respondents (race omitted); heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Univ health	Free univ health	Job guarantee	+600 USD unemp	Wealth tax	Income tax
w3_treataffects_blacks	-0.061* (0.033)	-0.031 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.033)	-0.043 (0.031)	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.052* (0.031)
w3_treataffects_whites	-0.017 (0.034)	0.025 (0.030)	0.052 (0.033)	0.005 (0.032)	0.035 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.032)
Democrat	—	—	—	—	—	—
Party3: Dem	0.020 (0.039)	0.107*** (0.039)	0.117*** (0.039)	0.153*** (0.041)	0.162*** (0.035)	0.127*** (0.039)
Party3: OtherNotSure	-0.151*** (0.049)	-0.062 (0.044)	-0.089* (0.047)	-0.046 (0.047)	-0.079* (0.044)	-0.113** (0.044)
Party3: Rep	-0.132*** (0.033)	-0.081*** (0.029)	-0.044 (0.033)	-0.023 (0.031)	-0.067** (0.032)	-0.061* (0.031)
IdeologyCont	-0.102*** (0.012)	-0.160*** (0.010)	-0.114*** (0.011)	-0.146*** (0.011)	-0.152*** (0.010)	-0.144*** (0.011)
IdeologyContNA	-0.270*** (0.058)	-0.432*** (0.058)	-0.415*** (0.058)	-0.451*** (0.060)	-0.478*** (0.057)	-0.473*** (0.058)
EducationCont	0.022*** (0.008)	0.016** (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)
Employment: Homemaker	-0.030 (0.048)	0.029 (0.044)	0.026 (0.045)	0.053 (0.047)	0.038 (0.044)	0.052 (0.045)
Employment: Other	0.079 (0.070)	0.057 (0.075)	0.014 (0.077)	0.153** (0.075)	0.156** (0.061)	0.192*** (0.065)
Employment: Part-time	0.077** (0.036)	0.051 (0.036)	-0.014 (0.038)	0.113*** (0.038)	0.054 (0.037)	0.063* (0.037)
Employment: Permanently disabled	0.066 (0.041)	0.112*** (0.039)	0.060 (0.040)	0.033 (0.040)	0.088** (0.038)	0.086** (0.040)
Employment: Retired	0.042 (0.029)	-0.062** (0.025)	-0.038 (0.028)	0.054* (0.027)	0.062** (0.026)	0.050* (0.027)
Employment: Student	0.093* (0.051)	0.060 (0.053)	-0.000 (0.056)	0.061 (0.060)	0.050 (0.051)	0.013 (0.053)
Employment: Temporarily laid off	0.091 (0.070)	0.138* (0.078)	0.056 (0.076)	0.218*** (0.073)	0.096 (0.073)	0.070 (0.084)
Employment: Unemployed	0.092** (0.046)	0.156*** (0.047)	0.111** (0.043)	0.153*** (0.047)	0.156*** (0.045)	0.149*** (0.046)
FamilyIncomeCont	0.005 (0.010)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.027*** (0.010)
FamilyIncomeContNA	-0.103** (0.047)	-0.116*** (0.042)	-0.179*** (0.047)	-0.129*** (0.044)	-0.063 (0.043)	-0.218*** (0.045)
Race: Asian	0.038 (0.084)	0.025 (0.084)	0.100 (0.083)	-0.137 (0.088)	0.062 (0.081)	-0.084 (0.098)
Race: Black	0.014 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.042)	0.004 (0.036)	0.018 (0.043)	-0.057 (0.038)	-0.112*** (0.040)
Race: Hispanic	-0.014 (0.065)	-0.027 (0.061)	0.002 (0.064)	0.031 (0.066)	-0.082 (0.064)	-0.164** (0.066)
Race: Middle Eastern	0.214*** (0.033)	0.250*** (0.035)	0.209*** (0.034)	0.298*** (0.038)	0.204*** (0.032)	0.271*** (0.035)
Race: Native American	-0.267** (0.108)	-0.123 (0.100)	-0.026 (0.111)	0.011 (0.104)	-0.114 (0.112)	-0.174 (0.107)
Race: Other	-0.117 (0.079)	-0.154** (0.072)	-0.070 (0.072)	-0.196*** (0.071)	-0.155* (0.079)	-0.295*** (0.076)
Race: Two or more races	0.033 (0.074)	-0.001 (0.076)	0.014 (0.084)	0.090 (0.069)	-0.055 (0.064)	0.007 (0.067)
Gender: Male	-0.042* (0.022)	-0.035* (0.020)	-0.084*** (0.021)	0.005 (0.021)	-0.081*** (0.020)	-0.037* (0.021)
w3_treataffects_blacks × Democrat	0.121** (0.049)	0.062 (0.048)	0.011 (0.048)	0.020 (0.051)	-0.028 (0.044)	0.012 (0.049)
w3_treataffects_whites × Democrat	0.088* (0.050)	0.065 (0.047)	-0.031 (0.048)	-0.041 (0.051)	-0.049 (0.043)	0.009 (0.048)

Table A21: Wave 3 treatment × Democrat, expanded covariates with race indicators (full sample)
Note: Treatment × Democrat, expanded covariates including race; full sample; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.5 Specification robustness and raw-data visualizations

This section reports the sensitivity of the main treatment-effect estimates to the choice of covariate adjustment, and shows the raw treatment–control differences in mean agreement by subgroup. All models use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and 90% confidence intervals. The canonical specification used in the main text (Table 2) appears as **S4** (“paper main”) in each ladder. The other specifications add controls cumulatively: **S0** is a bivariate regression of the outcome on treatment assignment with no controls; **S1** adds race indicators; **S2** adds gender and employment; **S3** adds family income and education; **S5** augments the paper main spec with party identification (Party3) and ideology; and **S6** (Wave 3 only) further adds the respondent’s own Wave-1 response to the same policy item as a baseline control. In the interaction models, Party3 is omitted from S5 (and S6, for Wave 3) to avoid collinearity with the moderator. Numbers on each point are the coefficient estimate; the label below each point reports the sample size retained under that specification’s covariate-completeness requirements.




Figure A7: Wave 1 raw treatment–control differences in mean agreement, by subgroup

Note: Points are the mean agreement in each treatment arm minus the mean agreement in the control arm, computed on the raw 0–1 outcome without any covariate adjustment. Bars are 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Each panel corresponds to one of the six policy questions; within each panel, the five columns partition respondents into all respondents, white respondents, non-white respondents, Republican identifiers, and non-Republican respondents. Sample-size labels report the total number of observations in each subgroup (control plus the relevant treatment arm).

Wave 1 treatment coefficient: Black & Hispanic
 HC1 SEs; 90% CI. Sample = all respondents with complete covariates per spec.




Figure A8: Wave 1 Black-and-Hispanic (T1) treatment coefficient across specifications

Note: Each panel plots the estimated coefficient on the Black-and-Hispanic treatment indicator (and 90% confidence interval) for one of the six policy outcomes, under six nested specifications S0–S5. Specification S4 is the canonical specification used in Table 2 of the main text. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; confidence intervals are for the treatment coefficient only. Sample sizes reflect complete-case covariate coverage for each specification.

Wave 1 treatment coefficient: Poor communities
 HC1 SEs; 90% CI. Sample = all respondents with complete covariates per spec.




Figure A9: Wave 1 Poor-communities (T2) treatment coefficient across specifications

Note: As in Figure A8, for the Poor-communities treatment arm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; 90% confidence intervals.

Wave 1: Minorities .. Rep interaction coefficient

HC1 SEs; 90% CI. Interaction coefficient from $y \sim \text{treat} * \text{Rep} + \text{controls}$. S4 matches the paper's canonical specification; Party3 dropped in S5 (collinear with Rep). Wave




Figure A10: Wave 1 Minorities \times Rep interaction coefficient across specifications

Note: Each panel plots the coefficient and 90% confidence interval on the Black-and-Hispanic \times Republican-identifier interaction in a model of the form $y = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{treat} + \gamma \cdot \text{Rep} + \delta \cdot (\text{treat} \times \text{Rep}) + \mathbf{X}'\boldsymbol{\theta} + \epsilon$, reported separately for each of the six policy outcomes and under six nested specifications S0–S5. Specification S4 is the canonical specification used in Table 2. Party3 is omitted from S5 to avoid collinearity with the Republican indicator. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Wave 3 treatment coefficient: Affects Blacks

HC1 SEs; 90% CI. Sample = all respondents with complete covariates per spec.




Figure A11: Wave 3 Affects-Blacks (T1) treatment coefficient across specifications

Note: Each panel plots the estimated coefficient on the Affects-Blacks treatment indicator (and 90% confidence interval) for one of the six policy outcomes, under seven nested specifications S0–S6. Specification S4 is the canonical Wave-3 specification used in Table 2. Specification S6 additionally controls for the respondent’s Wave-1 response to the same policy item. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Sample sizes reflect complete-case covariate coverage for each specification.

Wave 3 treatment coefficient: Affects Whites

HC1 SEs; 90% CI. Sample = all respondents with complete covariates per spec.




Figure A12: Wave 3 Affects-Whites (T2) treatment coefficient across specifications

Note: As in Figure A11, for the Affects-Whites treatment arm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; 90% confidence intervals.

Wave 3: Affects-Blacks .. Rep interaction coefficient

HC1 SEs; 90% CI. Interaction coefficient from $y \sim w3_treat * Rep + controls$. S4 matches the paper's canonical specification; Party3 dropped in S5/S6 (collinear with Rep)




Figure A13: Wave 3 Affects-Blacks \times Rep interaction coefficient across specifications

Note: Each panel plots the coefficient and 90% confidence interval on the Affects-Blacks \times Republican-identifier interaction in a model of the form $y = \alpha + \beta \cdot treat + \gamma \cdot Rep + \delta \cdot (treat \times Rep) + X'\theta + \epsilon$, reported separately for each of the six policy outcomes and under seven nested specifications S0–S6. Specification S4 is the canonical Wave-3 specification used in Table 2. Party3 is omitted from S5 and S6 to avoid collinearity with the Republican indicator. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Wave 3: Affects-Blacks .. Dem interaction coefficient

HC1 SEs; 90% CI. Interaction coefficient from $y \sim w3_treat * Dem + controls$. S4 matches the paper's canonical specification; Party3 dropped in S5/S6 (collinear with Dem)




Figure A14: Wave 3 Affects-Blacks \times Dem interaction coefficient across specifications

Note: As in Figure A13, with the moderator replaced by an indicator for Democratic identification. Party3 is omitted from S5 and S6 to avoid collinearity with the Democrat indicator. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; 90% confidence intervals.

B Proofs

This appendix provides an extended derivation of the results stated in the theory subsection of the main text. The numbering of equations cross-refers to the main text: Eq. (1) for the baseline utility, Eq. (3) for the posterior mean, Eq. (4) for the Kalman gain, Eq. (5) for expected utility, Eq. (6) for the cue's effect, and Eq. (7) for its decomposition. Assumptions (A1)–(A3) are the substantive restrictions on white voters' ideal points and on the parties' positions stated in the main text and used here without restatement.

Primitives. Voter j holds the partisan identity $P_j \in \{R, D, \emptyset\}$, an ideal point x_j for the race-neutral framing of the policy, and an ideal point x_j^T for the race-targeted framing; their party (when one exists) has positions $\bar{x}_{P_j}^N$ and $\bar{x}_{P_j}^T$ on the same two framings, with $x_j^N \equiv x_j$. The framing weight is the latent scalar $\theta \in [0, 1]$, with $\theta = 0$ corresponding to a fully race-neutral reading and $\theta = 1$ to a fully race-targeted reading. Conditional on θ , j 's utility from policy p is the framing-weight mixture of the two type-utilities,

$$U_j(p, \theta) = (1 - \theta) U_j^N(p) + \theta U_j^T(p), \quad (10)$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} U_j^N(p) &= -(1 - \alpha) (x_j^N - p)^2 - \alpha (\bar{x}_{P_j}^N - p)^2, \\ U_j^T(p) &= -(1 - \alpha) (x_j^T - p)^2 - \alpha (\bar{x}_{P_j}^T - p)^2. \end{aligned}$$

The single-framing utility (1) is the special case $x_j^N = x_j^T$ and $\bar{x}_{P_j}^N = \bar{x}_{P_j}^T$, in which $U_j(p, \theta)$ does not depend on θ .

Information. Voters do not directly observe θ . In period t , j 's prior on θ is

$$\theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\pi_t, \sigma_t^{\theta 2}).$$

Under the racial cue ($\rho = 1$), j observes a single conditionally-independent Gaussian signal centered at θ ,

$$s = \theta + \varepsilon, \quad \varepsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_s^2), \quad \varepsilon \perp \theta, \quad (11)$$

whose realized value is normalized to $s = 1$, that is, the cue points unambiguously to the race-targeted reading. Without the cue ($\rho = 0$), no signal is observed and the posterior coincides with the prior.

Posterior on the framing weight. Under the standard normal-normal conjugate update, the posterior on θ given ρ is Gaussian,

$$\theta \mid \rho \sim \mathcal{N}(\hat{\theta}_t(\rho), \tau_t^2(\rho)),$$

with parameters

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\theta}_t(\rho) &= \frac{\sigma_s^2}{\sigma_t^{\theta^2} + \sigma_s^2} \pi_t + \frac{\sigma_t^{\theta^2}}{\sigma_t^{\theta^2} + \sigma_s^2} s, & \tau_t^2(\rho) &= \frac{\sigma_t^{\theta^2} \sigma_s^2}{\sigma_t^{\theta^2} + \sigma_s^2}, & \rho &= 1, \\ \hat{\theta}_t(\rho) &= \pi_t, & \tau_t^2(\rho) &= \sigma_t^{\theta^2}, & \rho &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

Defining the Kalman gain on the framing signal as in (4),

$$\lambda_t^\theta \equiv \frac{\sigma_t^{\theta^2}}{\sigma_t^{\theta^2} + \sigma_s^2} \in [0, 1],$$

the cue-present posterior mean reduces to a convex combination of the prior mean and the realized signal:

$$\hat{\theta}_t(1) = (1 - \lambda_t^\theta) \pi_t + \lambda_t^\theta s.$$

Substituting $s = 1$ and rearranging,

$$\hat{\theta}_t(1) = (1 - \lambda_t^\theta) \pi_t + \lambda_t^\theta = \pi_t + \lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t), \quad \hat{\theta}_t(0) = \pi_t. \quad (12)$$

Together, the two cases in (12) are Eq. (3). Differencing,

$$\hat{\theta}_t(1) - \hat{\theta}_t(0) = \lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t). \quad (13)$$

The Kalman gain is monotone in prior framing uncertainty:

$$\frac{\partial \lambda_t^\theta}{\partial \sigma_t^{\theta^2}} = \frac{\sigma_s^2}{(\sigma_t^{\theta^2} + \sigma_s^2)^2} > 0,$$

strictly so whenever $\sigma_s^2 > 0$.

Expected utility. The voter evaluates policy p at the posterior, $EU_j(p, \rho) \equiv \mathbb{E}[U_j(p, \theta) \mid \rho]$. Because $U_j(p, \theta)$ in (10) is affine in θ , expectation passes through linearly,

$$\begin{aligned}EU_j(p, \rho) &= \mathbb{E}[(1 - \theta) U_j^N(p) + \theta U_j^T(p) \mid \rho] \\ &= (1 - \mathbb{E}[\theta \mid \rho]) U_j^N(p) + \mathbb{E}[\theta \mid \rho] U_j^T(p) \\ &= (1 - \hat{\theta}_t(\rho)) U_j^N(p) + \hat{\theta}_t(\rho) U_j^T(p),\end{aligned}$$

which is Eq. (5). The posterior variance $\tau_t^2(\rho)$ does not enter because the type-mixture has no θ^2 term; the quadratic structure of U_j^N and U_j^T in p is irrelevant to this step, since p is the policy under evaluation, not the random variable.

Treatment effect of the cue. The treatment effect on j 's expected utility is

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} &\equiv EU_j(p, 1) - EU_j(p, 0) = [(1 - \hat{\theta}_t(1)) U_j^N + \hat{\theta}_t(1) U_j^T] \\
&\quad - [(1 - \hat{\theta}_t(0)) U_j^N + \hat{\theta}_t(0) U_j^T] \\
&= [\hat{\theta}_t(1) - \hat{\theta}_t(0)] [U_j^T(p) - U_j^N(p)] \\
&= \lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t) [U_j^T(p) - U_j^N(p)],
\end{aligned}$$

where the last equality applies (13). This establishes Eq. (6). The sign of the cue's effect is the sign of the dimension-difference $U_j^T(p) - U_j^N(p)$; its magnitude is the product of the prior probability mass available to be shifted, $1 - \pi_t$, and the Kalman gain λ_t^θ .

Decomposition into two channels. Substituting the explicit forms of U_j^N and U_j^T ,

$$\begin{aligned}
U_j^T(p) - U_j^N(p) &= \left[-(1 - \alpha)(x_j^T - p)^2 - \alpha(\bar{x}_{p_j}^T - p)^2 \right] \\
&\quad - \left[-(1 - \alpha)(x_j^N - p)^2 - \alpha(\bar{x}_{p_j}^N - p)^2 \right] \\
&= \underbrace{-(1 - \alpha) [(x_j^T - p)^2 - (x_j^N - p)^2]}_{\text{beneficiary-composition channel}} \\
&\quad + \underbrace{-\alpha [(\bar{x}_{p_j}^T - p)^2 - (\bar{x}_{p_j}^N - p)^2]}_{\text{partisan cue-taking channel}},
\end{aligned}$$

which is Eq. (7). The first bracket vanishes when $x_j^T = x_j^N$, and the second vanishes when $\bar{x}_{p_j}^T = \bar{x}_{p_j}^N$. Combining with the treatment-effect formula,

$$\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} = -\lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t) \left\{ (1 - \alpha) [(x_j^T - p)^2 - (x_j^N - p)^2] + \alpha [(\bar{x}_{p_j}^T - p)^2 - (\bar{x}_{p_j}^N - p)^2] \right\}. \quad (14)$$

For white voters, (A1)–(A3) sign each bracket: under (A1), $x_j^T \geq x_j^N$, and if both lie above p then $(x_j^T - p)^2 \geq (x_j^N - p)^2$, making the beneficiary-composition bracket non-positive (so its contribution to $\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)}$ is non-positive). Under (A2), $\bar{x}_R^T > \bar{x}_R^N \geq p$ implies $(\bar{x}_R^T - p)^2 > (\bar{x}_R^N - p)^2$, making the partisan-channel bracket strictly negative for Republicans. Under (A3), $\bar{x}_D^T \leq \bar{x}_D^N \leq p$ implies $(\bar{x}_D^T - p)^2 \geq (\bar{x}_D^N - p)^2$, again non-positive for Democrats but typically with a smaller absolute gap than for Republicans on a given new policy. Each channel of $\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)}$ is therefore signed weakly negative for white voters, and the relative size of the two channels indexes which group is moved by the cue and on which type of policy.

Comparative static on prior framing uncertainty. Taking absolute values of (14) and differ-

entiating with respect to $\sigma_t^{\theta^2}$, holding π_t and the dimension-difference fixed,

$$\frac{\partial |\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)}|}{\partial \sigma_t^{\theta^2}} = \frac{\partial \lambda_t^\theta}{\partial \sigma_t^{\theta^2}} (1 - \pi_t) |U_j^T - U_j^N| = \frac{\sigma_s^2}{(\sigma_t^{\theta^2} + \sigma_s^2)^2} (1 - \pi_t) |U_j^T - U_j^N|,$$

which is strictly positive whenever $\sigma_s^2 > 0$, $\pi_t < 1$, and $U_j^T \neq U_j^N$. The magnitude of the cue's effect is therefore monotone increasing in prior framing uncertainty, as stated in the main text.

Limiting cases. Each of the four primitives in the treatment-effect formula

$$\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} = \lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t) [U_j^T(p) - U_j^N(p)]$$

admits a boundary value at which the cue becomes inert or degenerate. Working through them one at a time clarifies which empirical conditions correspond to which prediction in the main text.

(i) Prior framing uncertainty resolved: $\sigma_t^{\theta^2} \rightarrow 0$. Setting $\sigma_t^{\theta^2} = 0$ in the Kalman gain (4) gives

$$\lambda_t^\theta = \frac{0}{0 + \sigma_s^2} = 0.$$

Substituting $\lambda_t^\theta = 0$ into the cue-present posterior mean from (12),

$$\hat{\theta}_t(1) = (1 - 0) \pi_t + 0 \cdot s = \pi_t = \hat{\theta}_t(0).$$

The cue does not move the posterior, and substituting into the treatment-effect formula gives

$$\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} = 0 \cdot (1 - \pi_t) [U_j^T - U_j^N] = 0.$$

Substantively, this is the case in which the voter is already certain about how the policy is to be framed: there is no prior uncertainty for the cue to update. This is the micro-foundation of the Wave-3 prediction for Republicans: by March 2021, framing uncertainty about the Biden-era program has resolved among Republican identifiers ($\sigma_3^{\theta^2, R} \rightarrow 0$), so the cue is informationally inert regardless of how vivid the racial framing is.

(ii) Cue perfectly informative: $\sigma_s^2 \rightarrow 0$. Setting $\sigma_s^2 = 0$ in (4) gives

$$\lambda_t^\theta = \frac{\sigma_t^{\theta^2}}{\sigma_t^{\theta^2} + 0} = 1.$$

Substituting $\lambda_t^\theta = 1$ and $s = 1$ into the cue-present posterior mean,

$$\hat{\theta}_t(1) = (1 - 1) \pi_t + 1 \cdot 1 = 1.$$

The cue collapses the posterior onto $\theta = 1$ regardless of the prior π_t , and the treatment effect becomes

$$\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} = 1 \cdot (1 - \pi_t) [U_j^T - U_j^N] = (1 - \pi_t) [U_j^T - U_j^N].$$

Substantively, this is the case in which the voter takes the cue as an unambiguous declaration that the policy is race-targeted; the posterior places probability one on the race-targeted reading, and the cue's effect equals the dimension-difference scaled by the prior probability mass that was still available to be shifted.

(iii) Coincident framings: $x_j^T = x_j^N$ and $\bar{x}_{P_j}^T = \bar{x}_{P_j}^N$. Substituting these equalities into the type-utilities,

$$U_j^T(p) = -(1 - \alpha)(x_j^T - p)^2 - \alpha(\bar{x}_{P_j}^T - p)^2 = -(1 - \alpha)(x_j^N - p)^2 - \alpha(\bar{x}_{P_j}^N - p)^2 = U_j^N(p),$$

so the dimension-difference $U_j^T - U_j^N$ vanishes, and the treatment effect is

$$\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} = \lambda_t^\theta (1 - \pi_t) \cdot 0 = 0.$$

This is the case in which the two framings of the policy are payoff-equivalent for j : the cue has nothing of substance to update, even though it may still update beliefs about the framing weight θ . Applied channel-by-channel to (14), this case generates the within-Wave-3 selectivity across items. The beneficiary-composition channel coefficient is $-(1 - \alpha)[(x_j^T - p)^2 - (x_j^N - p)^2]$, which is small when $x_j^T \approx x_j^N$ for the policy in question; for universal items such as a federal job guarantee or universal health insurance, where the set of beneficiaries is hard to renegotiate, this approximate equality holds and the channel is muted. For the wealth tax, higher income taxes, and direct cash transfers, the gap $x_j^T - x_j^N$ is much larger and the channel is active. Symmetrically, the partisan cue-taking channel coefficient $-\alpha[(\bar{x}_{P_j}^T - p)^2 - (\bar{x}_{P_j}^N - p)^2]$ is small for parties whose race-neutral and race-targeted positions on a given policy are close, and large when they diverge sharply (as in the Republican case under (A2)).

(iv) Cue mass exhausted: $\pi_t \rightarrow 1$. Setting $\pi_t = 1$ in (13),

$$\hat{\theta}_t(1) - \hat{\theta}_t(0) = \lambda_t^\theta (1 - 1) = 0,$$

regardless of λ_t^θ . The prior is already fully concentrated on the race-targeted reading; the cue cannot push it further, and

$$\Delta_\rho U_j^{(t)} = \lambda_t^\theta \cdot 0 \cdot [U_j^T - U_j^N] = 0.$$

Note that this is observationally distinct from (i): in case (i) the voter has resolved their uncertainty (any value of π_t is fine), whereas here the voter may still be uncertain about θ (indeed $\sigma_t^{\theta^2}$ may be large), but their prior already places all of its mass at the race-targeted endpoint, leaving no room for a cue pointing in that same direction to do additional work. This is the second micro-foundation of the Wave-3 Republican null: the race-targeted reading of the Biden-era program is established as partisan common knowledge ($\pi_3^R \rightarrow 1$), so even a vivid racial cue brings no additional information.

Cases (i) and (iv) are observationally equivalent for predicting a null effect, but they correspond to distinct underlying psychological states — “I already know what the framing is” versus “the framing is already established as race-targeted” — and the data presented here cannot separate

them. Either is consistent with the Wave-3 Republican result. Case (iii), separated into its two channels, organizes the within-Wave-3 selectivity across items, and case (ii) provides the upper bound against which intermediate cue informativeness can be benchmarked.

C Survey Instruments

The survey questionnaires used to collect the data are included below. Questions are listed in the order of appearance. Notice that not all questions were asked to all respondents, since some were conditional on prior responses. Links to the surveys are included here:

Wave 1

<https://g4-us.yougov.com/v0XPKBcpHWgMt5>

Wave 2

<https://g4-us.yougov.com/vhFLc6hHcQYFTn>

<https://g4-us.yougov.com/vhjZZTwh9jBh1n>

Wave 3

<https://g4-us.yougov.com/vPtg2R8c3WHBBV>

Table C1: List of survey questions, in order of appearance

Number	Question text	Response options
1.	To reduce inequality of opportunity between children born in poor and rich families, the government has the ability and the tools to do	A lot, Some, Not much Nothing at all
2.	Did you vote in the 2018 midterm elections	Yes/No
3.	Did you vote in the 2008 presidential elections	Yes/No
4.	Did you vote in the last city-wide election in your area2. <i>Now we would like to ask you questions about your political activity before March 2020.</i>	Yes/No
<i>In the six months before March 2020 did you:</i>		
5.	Donate to a political campaign?	Yes/No
6.	Volunteer with a political campaign?	Yes/No
7.	Attend a political event (rally, town hall, meeting, small group etc.)?	Yes/No
8.	Watch a debate between political candidates?	Yes/No
9.	Read about a political candidate?	Yes/No
10.	Discussed the political environment with someone?	Yes/No
11.	Become politically active at the local level (city, county, congressional district etc.)? <i>Now we would like to ask you questions about your political activity between March 1, 2020 and today.</i>	Yes/No
<i>After March 1, 2020 did you:</i>		
12.	Donate to a campaign?	Yes/No
13.	Volunteer with a national campaign?	Yes/No
14.	Attend a political event (rally, town hall, meeting, small group etc.)?	Yes/No
15.	Watch a presidential primary debate	Yes/No
16.	Read about a candidate	Yes/No
17.	Discuss the political environment with someone	Yes/No
18.	Become politically active at the local level (city, county, congressional district etc.)? <i>Now we would like to ask you questions about your potential future political activity.</i>	Yes/No
<i>In the future ...</i>		
12b.	Do you intend to donate to a campaign?	Yes/No
13b.	Do you intend to volunteer with a campaign?	Yes/No
14b.	Do you plan to attend a political event?	Yes/No
15b.	Do you plan to watch a presidential debate?	Yes/No
16b.	Do you intend to read about a candidate?	Yes/No
17b.	Do you plan to discuss the political environment?	Yes/No
18b.	Do you intend to become politically active at the local level (city, county, congressional district etc.)?	Yes/No
19 open.	Approximately how much are you planning to donate for the remainder of the campaign?	Open
19.	Does COVID-19 affect your willingness to go to the polls? <i>Now we would like to ask you questions about your economic situation before and after March 1, 2020.</i>	Yes/No
20.	Which of the following best describes your employment status before March 2020?	Working full time, Working part time, Temporarily laid off, Unemployed, Permanently disabled, Retired, Student, Taking care of home or family, Other
21.	On March 1, 2020, which option best describes your occupation?	See occupational list in table C4
22.	From this list, which option best describes your last industry of occupation? <i>Now we would like to ask you questions about your economic situation after March 1, 2020.</i>	See occupational list in table C4
23.	Which of the following best describes your employment history between March 1 2020 and today? Select all that apply. For example, if you were unemployed in April and started working full time in May, select "Unemployed" and "Working full time".	Working full time, Working part time, Temporarily laid off, Unemployed, Permanently disabled, Retired, Student, Taking care of home or family, Other

Table C2: List of survey questions, in order of appearance (continued)

Number	Question text	Response options
24.	[If employed since March] From this list, which option best describes your current occupation right now?	See occupational list in table C4
25.	[If unemployed since March] From this list, which option best describes your last Industry of occupation?	See occupational list in table C4
26.	Does your work require regular contact with the public/clients inside a building?	Yes/No
27.	Are you eligible for sick leave?	Yes/No
28.	Do you own your own home? Yes/No	
29.	What is your estimated home value?	Open
30.	Have you had to work fewer hours since March 2020?	Yes/No
31.	Have you had to stop making rent payments or mortgage payments since March 2020?	Yes/No
32.	Do you own any of the following? [Select all that apply]	Real estate other than my primary residence, my own business, retirement savings account, financial assets other than retirement accounts
33.	Roughly, how much is your household's net worth (calculated by taking the value of your financial assets (savings and checking accounts, retirement savings etc.) and real estate assets, among other asset classes, and subtracting the value of your liabilities (credit card balances, student and car loans, mortgage debt etc.)?	Open
34.	Is anyone in your household, other than yourself, earning less income now than before March 1, 2020?	Yes/No
35.	Has anyone in your household, other than yourself, lost employment since March 1, 2020?	Yes/No
36.	Do you intend to vote in the upcoming 2020 presidential elections?	Yes/No
37.	If so, which of the two main parties' candidates are you likely to support?	Trump, Biden
38.	Do you consider yourself well-informed about the COVID-19 virus?	Yes/No
39.	Have you ever tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
40.	Has anyone in your household tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
41.	Do you know if anyone in your community (close neighbors or friends) has tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
42.	How many people do you know of (whose names you know) have tested positive for COVID-19?	Open
43.	Thinking about your workplace, on a scale from 1 through 5, where 1 indicates strongly agree, and 5 indicates strongly disagree, please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: My employer has taken sufficient safety measures to reduce employees' exposure to COVID19.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
44.	Did you, or anyone in your household, apply for any benefits offered through the economic stimulus bill passed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic?	Yes/No
45.	[If no one in household applied] Why not? [Select all that apply]	Was not aware of these programs, Not eligible, Did not have sufficient information to complete an application, Did not have time, Other
46.	[If someone in household applied] Have you, or anyone in your household, received any benefits from the economic stimulus programs introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic? [Select all that apply]	Small business loan, Stimulus check, Additional unemployment benefits, Other text
47.	Do you have the resources to continue meeting your regular expenses (including food, utilities etc.)?	Yes/No
48.	If you cannot meet your regular expenses, which of the following courses of action would you consider? [select all that apply]	Stop making regular payments such as utility and other bills, ask for financial support from parents, ask for financial support from other family members, ask for financial support from friends, ask for financial support from your local community, none
49.	Do you currently live in public housing, or receive housing benefits including rent assistance?	Yes/No
50.	Have you previously (at any point before March 1, 2020) applied for government assistance?	Yes/No
51.	Have you previously (at any point before March 1, 2020) been involved in the criminal legal system, including any charges or arrests for minor violations?	Yes/No
52.	Please select all the ways in which you have been previously (at any point before March 1, 2020) involved in the criminal legal system.	Probation, time in a halfway house, community service, house arrest with electronic monitoring, juvenile detention, jail, prison, incurred a fine, other
53.	Has anyone in your household previously served time in jail or prison	Yes/No

Table C3: List of survey questions, in order of appearance (continued)

Number	Question text	Response options
54.	Do you own a car, or do you have access to a car owned by someone in your household? <i>Experimental treatment (see description in Section 3)</i>	Yes/No
55. [order randomized]	Economic activity (such as keeping businesses open) should never be restricted, regardless of the public health consequences.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
56. [order randomized]	Controlling the virus justifies restricting economic activity, including shutting down businesses to slow the spread.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
57. [order randomized]	I support extending health insurance to all Americans, regardless of employment status for a small monthly premium payable by those covered by the program.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
58. [order randomized]	I support extending health insurance to all Americans, regardless of employment status, and at no cost to those being covered. The costs would be met through tax revenues.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
59. [order randomized]	I support offering employment to all job seekers who are unable to find a job through a federal job guarantee program.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
60. [order randomized]	I support extending unemployment benefits for as long as it takes for the economy to return to its employment level before the COVID-19 pandemic.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
61. [order randomized]	I support expanding weekly unemployment benefits by up to \$600 (\$2,400 a month) through the end of 2020.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
62. [order randomized]	I support expanding federal programs designed to help small businesses survive the current uncertainty.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
63. [order randomized]	I support expanding federal programs designed to help large corporations survive the current uncertainty.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
64. [order randomized]	I support the introduction of a wealth tax on households with more than \$25 million in wealth holdings in order to raise revenues to reduce the deficit and fund programs that were introduced in response to COVID-19.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
65. [order randomized]	I support an increase in income taxes for households earning above \$200,000	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree

Table C4: List of occupations for questions 21, 22, 24, and 25

Number	Occupation
1	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting
2	Mining, Oil and Gas Extraction, and Utilities
3	Construction
4	Manufacturing
5	Wholesale Trade
6	Retail Trade
7	Transportation and Warehousing
8	Media, Communications, and Digital Entertainment
9	Finance, Accounting, and Consulting
10	Insurance
11	Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing
12	Personal Care and Services
13	Research
14	Engineering, Computer-Related Design, and Architecture
15	Law and Legal Services
16	Education
17	Health Care and Social Assistance
18	Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
19	Restaurant, Travel and Lodging
20	Non-profit, Community, Religious and Social Service Organizations
21	Maintenance and Repair Services
22	Government
23	Other

Table C5: List of wave 2 survey questions, in order of appearance

Number	Question text	Response options
	<i>Since March 2020, more than 13 million Americans have contracted COVID-19, of whom more than 270,000 have died. These figures are reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The following questions describe positions on a number of potential policy responses to the COVID-19 economic and health crisis.</i>	
55. [order randomized]	Economic activity (such as keeping businesses open) should never be restricted, regardless of the public health consequences.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
56. [order randomized]	Controlling the virus justifies restricting economic activity, including shutting down businesses to slow the spread.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
57. [order randomized]	I support extending health insurance to all Americans, regardless of employment status for a small monthly premium payable by those covered by the program.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
58. [order randomized]	I support extending health insurance to all Americans, regardless of employment status, and at no cost to those being covered. The costs would be met through tax revenues.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
59. [order randomized]	I support offering employment to all job seekers who are unable to find a job through a federal job guarantee program.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
60. [order randomized]	I support extending unemployment benefits for as long as it takes for the economy to return to its employment level before the COVID-19 pandemic.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
61. [order randomized]	I support expanding weekly unemployment benefits by up to \$600 (\$2,400 a month) through the end of 2020.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
62. [order randomized]	I support expanding federal programs designed to help small businesses survive the current uncertainty.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
63. [order randomized]	I support expanding federal programs designed to help large corporations survive the current uncertainty.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
64. [order randomized]	I support the introduction of a wealth tax on households with more than \$25 million in wealth holdings in order to raise revenues to reduce the deficit and fund programs that were introduced in response to COVID-19.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
65. [order randomized]	I support an increase in income taxes for households earning above \$200,000	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
	<i>Now, we would like to understand your experiences with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.</i>	
34.	Is anyone in your household earning less income now than at the end of October 2020 (about 1 month ago)?	Yes/No
35.	Has anyone in your household lost employment between the end of October 2020 (about a month ago) and now?	Yes/No
39.	Have you ever tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
39b.	If they did test positive, were any of them hospitalized as a result?	Yes/No
40.	Has anyone in your household tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
40b.	If they did test positive, were any of them hospitalized as a result?	Yes/No
41.	Do you know if anyone in your community (close neighbors or friends) has tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
41b.	If they did test positive, were they hospitalized as a result (community)?	Yes/No
42.	How many people do you know of (whose names you know) have tested positive for COVID-19?	Open
47.	Do you have the resources to continue meeting your regular expenses (including food, utilities etc.)?	Yes/No
48.	If you cannot meet your regular expenses, which of the following courses of action would you consider? [select all that apply]	Stop making regular payments such as utility and other bills, ask for financial support from parents, ask for financial support from other family members, ask for financial support from friends, ask for financial support from your local community, none

Table C6: List of wave 2 survey questions, in order of appearance (continued)

Number	Question text	Response options
48-1.	Do you live with your parents, or your partner's parents, in the same household	Yes/No
85.	Do you have a bank account?	Yes/No
86.	Between March 2019 and March 2020, did you use a payday lender?	Yes/No
87.	Have you used a payday lender since March 1st 2020?	Yes/No
88.	Between March 2019 and March 2020, did you use a food bank?	Yes/No
89.	Have you used a food bank since March 1st 2020?	Yes/No
66.	Did you own and operate at least one business in 2019?	Yes/No
67.	If so, how many businesses did you own and operate in 2019?	Open text
68.	Across all your businesses, how many employees did you employ beside yourself in 2019?	Open text
69.	What were the total estimated retail sales in 2019 across all your businesses?	Open text
70.	Have any of your businesses ceased operation?	Yes/No
71.	Did the impact of COVID 19 on economic conditions contribute in a major way to the closure of your business(es)?	Yes/No
	<i>Now, we would like to ask you some questions about your political activity.</i>	
66-1.	Did you vote in the 2020 presidential election?	Yes/No
66-2.	If so, whom did you vote for?	Trump/Biden
	<i>In the future ...</i>	
12b.	Do you intend to donate to a campaign?	Yes/No
13b.	Do you intend to volunteer with a campaign?	Yes/No
14b.	Do you plan to attend a political event?	Yes/No
15b.	Do you plan to watch a presidential debate?	Yes/No
16b.	Do you intend to read about a candidate?	Yes/No
17b.	Do you plan to discuss the political environment?	Yes/No
18b.	Do you intend to become politically active at the local level (city, county, congressional district etc.)?	Yes/No
19 open.	Approximately how much are you planning to donate for the remainder of the campaign?	Open
	<i>Now, we would like to understand your general views about the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Please respond with whether you agree or disagree with the following statements on a scale of 1-5, where 1 indicates strongly agree, and 5 indicates strongly disagree.</i>	
76.	COVID-19 has had a disruptive effect on my life, in general.	Strongly agree - strongly disagree
77.	COVID-19 has had a disruptive effect on my financial well-being.	Strongly agree - strongly disagree
78.	COVID-19 has had a disruptive effect on my health.	Strongly agree - strongly disagree
79.	COVID-19 has had a disruptive effect on my ability to do things I enjoy.	Strongly agree - strongly disagree
80.	COVID-19 has had a disruptive effect on my ability to find work.	Strongly agree - strongly disagree
84.	Data provided by public health agencies can be trusted.	Strongly agree - strongly disagree
	<i>Now we would like to ask you questions about your experience with jobs in the "gig economy", such as driving for Uber or Lyft, delivering for GrubHub or Doordash, or accepting work through a platform that matches job seekers to employers for specific tasks, like Fiverr, Upwork, or other temporary jobs.</i>	
81.	Before March 2020, did you do any work in the gig economy or any temporary work?	Yes/No
82.	Since March 2020, have you done any work in the gig economy or any temporary work?	Yes/No
83.	Did you resort to this work in part due to financial pressures resulting from COVID-19 related disruptions?	Yes/No
72.	What do you think is the total number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in your state?	Open
	<i>Experimental manipulation (see Section A.5)</i>	
73.	Would you support implementing a mandatory mask mandate in your state?	Yes/No
73-1.	Would you support implementing a program that requires workers, students, and all those in public-facing roles in your state to take regular free COVID-19 tests?	Yes/No
73-2.	Would you support the closure of the following non-essential indoor businesses in your state? [Select all that apply]	Indoor dining at restaurants; retail stores; would not support the closure of any of these businesses
73-3.	Would you support the implementation of state-level contact-tracing (finding all those who came in contact with someone who recently tested positive) using mobile phone data that reveals who came in contact with the infected individual?	Yes/No
74.	Would you support the federal government taking a larger role in the response to COVID-19, for example, by implementing the following programs? [Select all that apply]	Federal mask mandate; Mandatory free COVID-19 tests for workers and students, nationwide; Nationwide closure of indoor dining at restaurants; Nationwide closure of retail stores; National contact-tracing program; None of the above

Respondents to the survey questionnaire were randomly assigned to one of two groups: treatment (n=1095) and control (n=1088). The control group did not see any information other than the questions themselves. Respondents in the treat group, on the other hand, saw the following message.

The total number of cases and the total number of deaths from COVID-19 in [respondent's state of residence] as of December 3rd, 2020, are:

[number of cases in respondent's state of residence] total cases [number of deaths in respondent's state of residence] total deaths

You had indicated that you thought the total number of cases and the total number of deaths from COVID-19 in [respondent's state of residence] were:

[respondent's answer to question 72. for number of cases] total cases [respondent's answer to question 72. for number of deaths] total deaths

Table C7: List of wave 3 survey questions, in order of appearance

Number	Question text	Response options
	<i>We would like you to consider the following hypothetical situation in order to help us think through your attitudes toward risk.</i>	
104.	Suppose you had a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to your current, total income. And that job was (your/your family's) only source of income. Then you are given the opportunity to take a new, and equally good job with a 50-50 chance that it would double your income and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it would cut your income and spending power by 10% (i.e. that you would only make 90% of your current income). Would you take the new job?	Yes/ No
105.	Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20% (i.e. that you would only make 80% of your current income). Would you still take the new job?	Yes/ No
106.	Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by a third (i.e. that you would only make two thirds, or 66%, of your current income). Would you still take the new job?	Yes/ No
107.	Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by half (i.e. that you would only make 50% of your current income). Would you still take the new job?	Yes/ No
108.	Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 75% (i.e. that you would only make a quarter, or 25%, of your current income). Would you still take the new job?	Yes/ No
	<i>Next, we would like to ask a few questions about your personal financial situation, and how that has changed because of the pandemic. Any answers you give will remain completely anonymous.</i>	
30.	Have you had to work fewer hours since March 2020?	Yes/No
31.	Have you had to stop making rent payments or mortgage payments since March 2020?	Yes/No
92.	Between March 2020 and now, have you lost income as a result of the impact of COVID-19?	Yes/No
93.	Between March 2020 and now, have you lost employment as a result of the impact of COVID-19?	Yes/No
94.	Between March 2020 and now, have you had to sell assets (for example, valuables, cars, real estate, financial assets such as stocks or bonds) in order to meet your expenses?	Yes/No
95.	Between March 2020 and now, have you had to tap into your retirement funds (401k, 403b, IRA etc.) in order to meet your expenses?	Yes/No
96.	Between March 2020 and now, have you had to take on debt (through personal loans, credit cards etc.) in order to meet your expenses? [Select all that apply]	Home equity loan, personal loan, credit card(s), no, other
97.	Between March 2020 and now, have you had to retire earlier than you were planning to?	Yes/No
	<i>The following questions are about your monthly income at the start of the pandemic and now. If you would prefer not to answer, please select 'I would prefer not to say'.</i>	
90.	Roughly how much in monthly income (including all sources) were you making before the pandemic started in March 2020?	Open
91.	Roughly how much in monthly income (including all sources) are you making now?	Open



Table C8: List of wave 3 survey questions, in order of appearance (continued)

Number	Question text	Response options
	<i>Now, we would like to understand your experiences with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic since March 2020.</i>	
34-2.	Is anyone in your household earning less income now than in March 2020?	Yes/No
35-2.	Has anyone in your household lost employment between March 2020 and now?	Yes/No
39-2.	Have you ever tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
39b-2.	If you did test positive, were you hospitalized as a result?	Yes/No
40-2.	Since March 2020, has anyone in your household tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
40b-2.	If they did test positive, were they hospitalized as a result?	Yes/No
41-2.	Since March 2020, do you know if anyone in your community (close neighbors or friends) has tested positive for COVID-19?	Yes/No
41b-2.	If they did test positive, were they hospitalized as a result?	Yes/No
42-2.	Since March 2020, how many people do you know of (whose names you know) have tested positive for COVID-19?	Open
23.	Which of the following best describes your employment status since March 2020? [Select all options that apply]	Working full time, Working part time, Temporarily laid off, Unemployed, Permanently disabled, Retired, Student, Taking care of home or family, Other
24.	If employed since March, which option best describes your last Industry of occupation?	See occupational list in table C4
25.	If unemployed since March, which option best describes your last Industry of occupation?	See occupational list in table C4
98.	Have you received a COVID-19 vaccine, or do you expect to receive a vaccine in the next 4 weeks?	Yes/ No
99.	Roughly, how long do you expect to wait before receiving a vaccine?	Open
100.	Do you know anyone who has received a COVID-19 vaccine?	Yes/ No
44.	Did you, or anyone in your household, apply for any benefits offered through the economic stimulus bill passed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic?	Yes/No
45.	If no one in your household applied, why not? [Select all that apply]	Was not aware of these programs, Not eligible, Did not have sufficient information to complete an application, Did not have time, Other
46.	Have you, or anyone in your household, received any benefits from the economic stimulus programs introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic? [Select all that apply]	Small business loan, Stimulus check, Additional unemployment benefits, Other text
47.	Do you have the resources to continue meeting your regular expenses (including food, utilities etc.)?	Yes/No
48.	If you cannot meet your regular expenses, which of the following courses of action would you consider? [select all that apply]	Stop making regular payments such as utility and other bills, ask for financial support from parents, ask for financial support from other family members, ask for financial support from friends, ask for financial support from your local community, none
87.	Have you used a payday lender since March 1st 2020?	Yes/No
89.	Have you used a food bank since March 1st 2020?	Yes/No
66.	Did you own and operate at least one business in 2019?	Yes/No
70.	Have any of your businesses ceased operation?	Yes/No
71.	Did the impact of COVID 19 on economic conditions contribute in a major way to the closure of your business(es)?	Yes/No
101.	Do you expect your own financial situation to improve within a year from now?	Yes/ No
102.	And how about the wider economy? Do you expect economic conditions in the wider economy to improve within a year from now?	Yes/ No
103.	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	Yes/ No
	<i>Now, we would like to ask you some questions about your political activity.</i>	
66-1.	Did you vote in the 2020 presidential election?	Yes/No
66-2.	If so, whom did you vote for?	Trump/Biden
	<i>In the future ...</i>	
13b.	do you intend to volunteer with a campaign?	Yes/No
14b.	do you think you will attend a political event?	Yes/No
15b.	do you intend to watch a presidential debate?	Yes/No
16b.	do you intend to read about a candidate?	Yes/No



Table C9: List of wave 3 survey questions, in order of appearance (continued)

Number	Question text	Response options
17b.	do you intend to discuss the political environment with someone?	Yes/No
18b.	do you intend to become politically active at the local level (city, county, congressional district etc.)?	Yes/No
12b.	are you planning to donate to a campaign in the future?	Yes/No
19 open.	Approximately how much are you planning to donate? Now we would like to ask you questions about your experience with jobs in the "gig economy", such as driving for Uber or Lyft, delivering for GrubHub or Doordash, or accepting work through a platform that matches job seekers to employers for specific tasks, like Fiverr, Upwork, or other temporary jobs.	Open
82.	Since March 2020, have you done any work in the gig economy or any temporary work?	Yes/No
83.	Did you resort to this work in part due to financial pressures resulting from COVID-19 related disruptions? <i>Experimental treatment (see Sections A.5 A.5, and A.5)</i>	Yes/No
55. [order randomized]	Economic activity (such as keeping businesses open) should never be restricted, regardless of the public health consequences.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
56. [order randomized]	Controlling the virus justifies restricting economic activity, including shutting down businesses to slow the spread.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
57. [order randomized]	I support extending health insurance to all Americans, regardless of employment status for a small monthly premium payable by those covered by the program.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
58. [order randomized]	I support extending health insurance to all Americans, regardless of employment status, and at no cost to those being covered. The costs would be met through tax revenues.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
59. [order randomized]	I support offering employment to all job seekers who are unable to find a job through a federal job guarantee program.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
60. [order randomized]	I support extending unemployment benefits for as long as it takes for the economy to return to its employment level before the COVID-19 pandemic.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
61. [order randomized]	I support expanding weekly unemployment benefits by up to \$600 (\$2,400 a month) through the end of 2020.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
62. [order randomized]	I support expanding federal programs designed to help small businesses survive the current uncertainty.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
63. [order randomized]	I support expanding federal programs designed to help large corporations survive the current uncertainty.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
64. [order randomized]	I support the introduction of a wealth tax on households with more than \$25 million in wealth holdings in order to raise revenues to reduce the deficit and fund programs that were introduced in response to COVID-19.	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree
65. [order randomized]	I support an increase in income taxes for households earning above \$200,000	Strongly agree - Strongly disagree

Survey wave 3 control message: Since the beginning of the pandemic, more than 29 million Americans have contracted COVID-19, of whom more than 520,000 have died. Many have also lost their jobs as a result of restrictions on activity designed to slow the spread of the disease. However, the health and economic impact of COVID-19 has not affected everyone equally. One example of the range of outcomes across states is illustrated in these figures of cases and deaths (per 100,000) for Kansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Missouri (data from covidtracking.org).



Survey wave 3 treatment group 1 message: Since the beginning of the pandemic, more than 29 million Americans have contracted COVID-19, of whom more than 520,000 have died. Many have also lost their jobs as a result of restrictions on activity designed to slow the spread of the disease. However, the health and economic impact of COVID-19 has not affected everyone equally. For example, in Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma and West Virginia, whites were more likely than African Americans to have contracted COVID-19, and also more likely to have died (data from covidtracking.org).



Survey wave 3 treatment group 2 message: Since the beginning of the pandemic, more than 29 million Americans have contracted COVID-19, of whom more than 520,000 have died. Many have also lost their jobs as a result of restrictions on activity designed to slow the spread of the disease. However, the health and economic impact of COVID-19 has not affected everyone equally. For example, in Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri and Virginia, African Americans were more likely than whites to have contracted COVID-19, and also more likely to have died (data from covidtracking.org).

